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The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: More than Forty
Years Later a Proposal for the Future
Javier Arteaga

∗

I. INTRODUCTION – THE YEAR WAS 1966
United States’ armed forces, 250,000 soldiers strong, conduct raids in
1
efforts to capture, wound, and kill the Viet Cong. Meanwhile, Americans
2
hold demonstrations throughout the homeland in protest. Martin Luther
King, Jr. leads a civil-rights march in Chicago, Illinois, during which he is
3
struck by a rock thrown from an angry white mob. Actor Ronald Reagan, a
4
Republican, is elected Governor of California, and Lyndon B. Johnson is
5
President of the United States. “The Man Trap,” the first episode of the
6
science fiction television series Star Trek, airs, and the Beatles play their
annual American concert in New York’s Shea Stadium on a makeshift stage
7
placed over second base. The U.S. Supreme Court rules in Miranda v.
8
Arizona that the police must inform criminal suspects of their rights before
9
10
proceeding to question them. The Freedom of Information Act is enacted
11
into law. The year was 1966. Also in this colorful, yet dark, year in
American history, Cuban nationals immigrated to the United States in
* J.D., Florida International University, College of Law, 2008. I would like to first thank my
parents, Ana O. and Luis E. Arteaga. It was their efforts and love that figuratively and literally brought
this paper to life. I would also like to thank my grandparents whose difficult decisions brought my
family to the United States; Professor Troy E. Elder for continuous guidance; the Law Review staff at
the Florida International University College of Law for providing the opportunity to write freely on this
topic; the Class of 2008 for inspiring me; and Tanya R. Baur and Diana Arteaga for supporting me.
1
U.S. Strength Rises to 250,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1966, at 3.
2
Douglas Robinson, Vietnam Protest Snarls Times SQ, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1966, at 1.
3
Gene Roberts, Rock Hits Dr. King as Whites Attack March in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1966, at 1.
4
Lawrence Davis, Reagan Elected by a Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1966, at 1.
5
Johnson Greets ’66 with Family; Spends Most of First Day at His Desk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1966, at 21.
6
Ron Wertheimer, Captain’s Log: We’re Back and, Boy, Are we Young, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1998, at E25.
7
Paul L. Montgomery, Beatles Bring Shea to a Wild Pitch of Hysteria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
1966, at 40.
8
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9
Id.
10 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
11 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (landmark events of 1966).
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12

record numbers, and on November 2, 1966, Congress enacted, and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed, the Cuban Adjustment Act (“CAA”) into
13
law.
November 2, 2006, marked the 40th Anniversary of the establishment
of the CAA. The Act today reads as follows:
[T]he status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who
has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to January 1, 1959, and has been physically present in the
United States for at least one year, may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if
the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United
States for permanent residence . . . . The provisions of this Act . . .
shall be applicable to the spouse and child of any alien described in
this subsection, regardless of their citizenship and place of birth, who
14
are residing with such alien in the United States . . . .
Since the establishment of the CAA over forty years ago, Cubans have been
15
granted unparalleled access to the U.S. Known as America’s “special favorites,” “self-imposed political exiles,” and “consumer refugees,” Cubans
are the only group granted such “special privileges” and “favorable immi16
gration laws.”
17
The favoritism is best illustrated through an anecdote. Five miles off
the coast of Miami, Florida, a vessel carrying 131 Haitian nationals who
had fled Haiti stopped and picked up two Cubans at sea. They were near
death because their boat had capsized. When the vessel arrived in Miami,
the Haitians were all sent back to Haiti. The two Cubans were granted

12 Kennedys Conduct Hearing on Cubans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1966, at 9 (indicating that
300,000 Cubans awaited permanent residency in the U.S. in 1966).
13 Cuban Refugees Seek New Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1966, at 15.
14 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). For further clarification, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines an alien as “any person not a citizen or national of the
United States.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). The term
“admitted” with respect to aliens means “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(13)(A).
15 See Berta Esperanza Hernánadez-Truyol, On Becoming the Other: Cubans, Castro, And Elian –
a LatCritical Analysis, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 687, 708 (2001) [hereinafter The Other].
16 See Alberto J. Pérez, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy Between Cubans, Haitians, and the United States Immigration Policy, 28 NOVA. L. REV. 437, 437 (2004) [hereinafter
No Foot].
17 See Joyce A. Hughes, Flight From Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 39-40 (2000) [hereinafter
Flight].
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access to the U.S. and after one year were eligible to receive green cards
18
solely based on their nationality.
19
Ordinarily, to qualify for admission to the U.S., an immigrant must fit
20
within one of the various categories established by Congress. If an immigrant fits within a class he or she will be given a visa, a pass obtained at a
U.S. consulate office outside the U.S. issued by the American government
21
for the purpose of entering the U.S. The system provides two opportunities to examine the alien’s eligibility. First, while abroad, and second, on
22
U.S. soil by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). A nonimmigrant alien, one who enters the U.S. not intending to achieve permanentresident status, e.g., a tourist, who later intends to permanently reside in the
23
U.S., may adjust status under INA § 245. If an alien enters the U.S. without a visa, he or she is inadmissible, subject to removal from the U.S., and
24
if removed from the U.S., barred from reentering for a period of ten years.
The reason for highlighting these general procedural processes is because
25
Cubans, under the CAA, are exempt from the visa process. Cubans upon
arrival in the U.S. without a visa may still achieve permanent residency in
26
the U.S. All they need is the CAA. The bill allows “Cubans who have
been living in the United States . . . to obtain full residence. This in turn
27
will qualify them for eventual citizenship.” The CAA when enacted also
applied retroactively up to thirty months; thus, those Cubans who arrived in
the U.S. after June 2, 1964, could “waive half the waiting period of five
28
years that is required for citizenship.” Additionally, the CAA applies to all
18 Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: ¿Mirando Por Los Ojos De Don Quijote o Sancho
Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 902 (2001) [hereinafter Don Quijote].
19 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006) (the term “immigrant,” as defined by Congress in the INA, is every alien who does not fit within the classes of nonimmigrants).
20 See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 239 (4th ed.,
Foundation Press 2005) (1992) [hereinafter Legomsky].
21 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(16), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(16) (2006).
22 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 1-1 IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 1.03 (C) (I) (2006).
23 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1245 (2006) (the CAA is a footnote of
this section of the INA).
24 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1212(a)(7) (2006).
25 See Peter Slevin, Policy on Cuban Immigration Tangled in Contradiction, MIAMI HERALD,
May 23, 1993, at 22A
26 Id.
27 Senate Approves Residence Status for Cuba Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1966, at 7.
28 See id.; Adjustment of Status for Cuban Refugees: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 11-20 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings]
(Rep. Ball did not consider the waiver of 30 months to be a “large consideration.” The 5-year period
was implemented to give aliens a reasonable opportunity to adjust and assimilate to life in the U.S. This
period allowed an alien to “learn the ways of this country, and in that way to make himself or herself
better qualified to assume the responsibilities of citizenship. The Hon. Ball, after explaining the necessity of the 5-year period, transitioned to why Cubans do not need the 5-year period, and never gave an
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future Cuban refugees, and continues to serve its favorable and expedited
29
immigration benefits on Cubans in the U.S.
This immigration dichotomy, i.e., the distinction made between Cubans and all other groups, as well as the present realities and future of the
CAA are the focuses of this comment. Part II of this comment takes a look
30
at the events that led to the enactment of the CAA. Part III considers the
effects of the CAA over the past 40 years based on the considerations and
31
statements made by the Members of Congress that created the CAA. Part
IV proposes balancing the benefits of the CAA by including groups similar32
ly situated to Cubans, particularly Haitians. Part V concludes this comment by summarizing how to eliminate the “preferential” treatment of Cubans by recognizing that Cubans and Haitians are inseparable for immigra33
tion purposes.
II. BACKGROUND – SUPPORT AND CRITICISM OF THE CAA
A. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Speech and the Congressional Hearings
Regarding Adjustment of Status for Cuban Refugees
On October 3, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed the na34
tion with regard to changes in America’s immigration policies. The presidential speech was given from Liberty Island, home of the Statue of Liber35
ty, and at the base of an American flag about 75 yards from the statue. A
explanation. “It would seem to us . . . that Cubans nationals who have been in this country for 3 or 4
years, even though they may have been here under parole status, would have probably acquired as much
knowledge of the United States, as if they had come in under an immigrant visa in the first instance. So
there would seem to us to be a slight equity in having this date run from the time in which their first
entry was made.” The Hon. Ball did, however, mention that this was a matter to be argued).
29 See id.; Richard Eder, Ball Urges Immigrant Status for Cuban Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1966, at 12 (originally left open to apply in the future to an estimated 4,000 Cubans that were brought
by airlift to Miami on a monthly basis).
30 See infra Part II.
31 See infra Part III.
32 See infra Part IV.
33 See infra Part V. This comment is not meant in any way to advocate against the special treatment of Cubans; however, it will expose forty years of trends and consequences that are no longer
supported by the initial rationales behind the Act. Instead, the Act now is supported by a new set of
rationales. Additionally, the need for expansion of the CAA, based on my research and personal experiences with how the Act plays-out in the real world, is a result of the new rationales supporting the
CAA. I am the son of Cuban immigrants. My mother arrived in the U.S. in 1980 as part of the Mariel
Boatlift. She continues to save the slip of paper issued to her by the U.S. government that indicates her
arrival and acceptance to the U.S. My parents and I, as well as a large portion of my community and
law school, have benefited from the special privileges; however, I do not feel a selfish need to keep the
focus of the treatment solely on Cubans. My position, which I intend to explain throughout this comment, calls for increased access to all similarly-situated immigrant groups.
34 Robert B. Semple Jr., U.S. to Admit Cubans Castro Frees; Johnson Signs New Immigration
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1965, at 1.
35 Id.
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more patriotic setting could not have been scripted. The President announced that he
[opened] the nation’s gates to all Cubans who wanted to escape the regime of Fidel Castro and ‘seek freedom’ in the United States . . . .
[T]hat it was in the spirit of America’s ‘tradition as an asylum for the
oppressed’ that he was telling ‘the people of Cuba that those who seek
36
refuge [in the United States] will find it.’
President Johnson was responding directly to a claim made by then-Prime
37
Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro, just days earlier. First, on September 28,
1965, and then again on September 30, 1965, Castro announced there was
no penalty or consequence for Cuban nationals who wished to flee the isl38
and of Cuba for the U.S. The diplomatic feud that ensued between the
two governments led to President Johnson’s approval of the most liberal
39
U.S. immigration policies in over forty years.
On August 10, 11, and 17 of 1966, the spirit of President Johnson’s
speech carried-over to a set of congressional hearings conducted by a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary. The reason for discussion was the various “views of the immediately concerned departments
of government on the question of authorizing adjustment of status for Cu40
ban refugees.” Adjustment of status, as previously mentioned, is the procedural process for achieving legal and permanent immigration standing in
41
the U.S.; but, generally a visa is still required.
However, in 1966, the only means for a Cuban refugee in the U.S. to
obtain a permanent visa was by leaving the U.S. and applying at an Ameri42
can consulate abroad, usually in Mexico or Canada. According to the
Hon. George Ball, a participant in the August 10, 1966, hearing, this proce43
dure had “not proved satisfactory” for three practical reasons. First, “the
trip abroad is costly for many Cuban refugees; for many the cost is prohibi44
tive.” An estimated 300,000 Cuban refugees were present in the U.S. in
36

Id. (alteration in original).
THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cu.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2008) (Fidel Castro held the position of Prime Minister of Cuba from February 1959 until
February 1976 when that position was abolished. He later took office as President).
38 Robert B. Semple, Jr., U.S. to Admit Cubans Castro Frees; Johnson Signs New Immigration
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1965, at 4.
39 See id.
40 Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of Rep. Feighan).
41 See DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A
NUTSHELL 112-113 (5th ed., Thomson West 2005); Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. §
1245 (2006).
42 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 4; Cuban Refugees Seek New Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1966, at 15.
43 Hearings, supra note 28, at 4; Richard Eder, Ball Urges Immigrant Status for Cuban Refugees,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1966, at 12.
44 Hearings, supra note 28, at 4.
37
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1966.
“Only about 70,000 of the 300,000 . . . could afford this.”
Second, American consulates abroad are too understaffed to handle claims
by persons outside the local consulate district; thus, only a small percentage
of applicants were being considered and a smaller percentage were granted
47
visas. Third, admission into other countries was not often granted for the
48
purpose of applying for an American visa from within said country.
Other more politically loaded concerns were expressed by the sub49
committee while debating the “strongly supported” bill that created an
expedited process and means for Cuban refugees to adjust their status to
50
permanent residency. For example, the U.S. desired to “play a full and
sympathetic role as a country of asylum for refugees from communism,
whether the country of flight is located in the Eastern or Western Hemis51
phere.” Theoretically, every Cuban who fled Cuba for the U.S. inevitably
52
became one more vote that favored a free, capitalist world. Furthermore,
[American] policy . . . is one of opposition to the Communist regime
in Cuba. Our goal and strong desire is that Cuba shall be freed from
Communist domination and shall return again to the free world . . . .
[T]his special help to Cubans . . . in no way reflects any change in our
53
attitude or any lessening in our determination.
The bill in no way was meant to indicate that the U.S. supported or recog54
nized Castro’s regime as legitimate. The subcommittee found it essential
that this “basic consideration be fully clarified and emphasized . . . [to en55
sure no] public misunderstanding . . . .” Immigration reform provided
relief to the Cuban people while maintaining a stringent anti-Castro posi56
tion. “[The] decision to grant citizenship to the refugees should not be
understood as an implicit concession that the . . . [Cuban] Government [is]
57
more or less permanent.” Less political rationales for the CAA were peppered throughout the subcommittee’s hearings, but the tension between
Cuba and the U.S. could not be denied. “This subcommittee appreciates the
45 See Robert B. Semple, Jr., U.S. to Admit Cubans Castro Frees; Johnson Signs New Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1965, at 1.
46 Id. (enactment of the CAA meant Cubans could become permanent residents of the U.S. by
simply filling out an application. “The usual $25 fee for changing immigration status was waived.”).
47 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 4.
48 Id.
49 Richard Eder, Ball Urges Immigrant Status for Cuban Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1966, at
12.
50 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 4.
51 Id.
52 See Changes, infra note 80, at 234.
53 Hearings, supra note 28, at 4.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 5.
56 See id.
57 Eder, supra note 49, at 12.
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assurances that . . . have been given today that adjustment of status for these
Cuban refugees which the Department recommends be authorized, in no
way reflects or infers a change in basic U.S. policy toward the Communist
58
occupation of Cuba.”
In a letter written by Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark on August 4, 1966, to the Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Committee on
the Judiciary, Mr. Clark detailed other justifications for exempting Cubans
“from the proscription against natives of other Western Hemisphere coun59
tries as to eligibility for adjustment of immigration status.” First, an esti60
mated 164,000 Cubans had arrived in the U.S. in a one-month period.
Upon arrival in the U.S., the Cubans remained in an “indefinite and nonresident status [due to] the upheaval in their native country causing them to
61
flee and remain in the United States.” Second, the U.S. severed all diplo62
matic ties with Cuba on January 3, 1961. This was a decision made by
former-President Dwight D. Eisenhower after a series of failed negotiations
with Cuba over sugar quotas and the increase of Cuban relations with the
63
Soviet Union. Since then, it has been impossible for Cubans in Cuba to
apply for an immigration visa for the purpose of seeking permanent resi64
dency in the U.S. Third, many professionally-trained Cubans who “would
be a credit to this country” were prevented from gaining professional employment in the U.S. due to statutes that required full citizenship or a declaration of intent of citizenship before practicing certain professions (e.g.,
65
dentists, lawyers, physicians, and teachers). “Enactment of this legislation
would remove many bars to the self-sufficiency of Cuban refugees” in the
66
U.S. Fourth, the financial burden on the American government, with re-

58 Hearings, supra note 28, at 10 (statement of Rep. Feighan, addressing the letter of Deputy
Attorney General Ramsey Clark).
59 Id. at 8 (several letters were presented as evidence during the hearings. They were read aloud
to the Subcommittee members, and then discussed).
60 Id. at 9.
61 Id.
62 See id.
63 JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ, TO MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION: CUBA’S FOREIGN POLICY
23-25 (Harvard University Press 1989). Sugar quotas were constantly in debate between the U.S. and
Cuba. After Castro took control of Cuba, he eliminated the quotas “for the sake of independence.” In
1960, the U.S. attempted to improve relations with Cuba, but “the Castro regime virtually paralyzed the
negotiations with various excuses and evasions which were designed to gain time until” a pact was
signed with the Soviets. On July 6, 1960, President Eisenhower cut the sugar quota by 95 percent, and
three days later, on July 9, 1960, the Soviet Union agreed to buy from Cuba all the sugar that the U.S.
refused to purchase. In December 1960, the U.S. sugar quota was fixed at zero. On January 1, 1961,
Cuba restricted the personnel of the American embassy in Havana as the U.S. “broke off diplomatic
relations” with Cuba.
64 Hearings, supra note 28, at 9.
65 Id.
66 Id.

516

FIU Law Review

[3:509
67

gards to unsettled Cubans, would be reduced. These rationales or concerns will later be discussed in Part III of this comment in light of the past
forty years of political stalemate and change.
Perhaps the most interesting dialogue took place between the Hon.
George Ball, Under-Secretary of State, and Rep. Frank L. Chelf from Kentucky.
Mr. Chelf: Mr. Secretary, I listened very carefully to your testimony.
I would like to ask you again, for the record, just to be sure, outside of
the humanitarian feature that is involved here, do you sincerely believe that this legislation is in the best interests of the United States?
That is the thing that I am interested in. I want to do all that I can to
help others, but the point that worries me—you see, we have helped
100 nations and we have given 122 billions of our dollars away, only
to have the fellows overseas now, who are fat and sleek and rich, to
take our own dollars and demand our gold out of Fort Knox. Now, I
know it is going on and everybody else knows it, but will this help us
here?
....
Mr. Ball: We would be extending to [the Cubans] the privilege of living in a free society. This is consistent with the principles that we
have followed in our dealing with nations around the world, to encourage freedom, to encourage resistance to totalitarianism. We have
a feeling that this would be a contribution to creating a consistent vision of the United States of a nation that practices what it preaches
and which extends to people who are hard pressed under totalitarian
regimes the possibility of becoming useful citizens of the United
States working toward the general cause of freedom.
Mr. Chelf: Being very much interested in it, and to the extent that I
paid my own way out of my own pocketbook, I made a trip, incognito,
down to Florida in April of this year. I had been hearing about the
Cubans and how many we had and what they were doing, and all that
sort of thing . . . . [N]o newspaper, nowhere, at no time knew I was
there. I got some good information and I just want to say this to you: I
think that you are exactly right, for the very simple reason I saw lawyers and doctors and other professional men working at menial tasks,
something that was foreign to them but yet they had mastered to the
best of their ability that trade. I saw with my own eyes firsthand these
people and I talked to them in my broken Spanish as best I could, and

67 Id. In Part III of this comment these rationales will be discussed in light of the past 40 years of
political stalemate and change.
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let me tell you something, I was very much impressed with them.
68
They are very fine people and they come from good stock.
The debate continued, but the essence of the conversation is summarized by
a point made by the Hon. George Ball. He found that the adjustment of the
immigration status of Cuban refugees was “necessary.” “If we do not take
this step . . . [it] is going to be a pretty unedifying spectacle to many nations
of the world. And many people are going to doubt whether the United
69
States really means what is says.”
Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, then Attorney General of the United
70
“Such legislation would be a humane
States, also backed the bill.
postscript to the message formulated by our Government and voiced by the
71
President,” said the Attorney General while referencing President Johnson’s speech from Liberty Island. However, the Attorney General noted
72
that the adjustment of status was not automatic. It was to be voluntary on
the part of the Cubans, and subject to the discretion of the Attorney Gener73
al.
B. Statistical Background
At this point, some statistical background will help clarify why former
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Congress found it necessary to install the
Cuban refugee reform laws. On August 17, 1966, the Hearings continued.
This time representatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel74
fare (“Department”) were in the hot seat. According to the Department,
75
there were three stages in Cuban migration to the U.S.
The first period was January 1959 – October 1962. On January 2,
1959, Fidel Castro marched into Havana and proclaimed, “[t]he revolution
76
begins now.” At this stage, no one could predict the future of the regime,
but as the Cuban government began to enact “agrarian reform laws and
other measures to confiscate private enterprises,” there was an increase of
77
Cubans seeking asylum to the United States. The years 1960-1962 saw
more confiscations by the Cuban government, and the eventual manage78
ment and control of these properties. At this stage, professionals and

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 13.
Hearings, supra note 28, at 31.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Hearings, supra note 28, at 49.
Id.
DOMÍNGUEZ, supra note 63, at 16.
Hearings, supra note 28, at 50.
Id.
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technicians, those formerly in control, left Cuba for the U.S. These persons have been called the “Golden Exiles” for their high level of education,
80
political and business connections, and entrepreneurial know-how. Diplomatic tensions grew to a destructive stage in 1961 when the U.S. government was forced to sever its relations with Cuba; meanwhile, Cubans con81
tinued to flee the island. An estimated 215,000 refugees fled Cuba during
82
this three year period.
The second period was October 1962 – October 1965. Cuban migration to the U.S. was brought to a standstill for three years after the Cuban
83
Missile Crisis in October of 1962. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the vast
majority of Cuban refugees already in the U.S. were in Miami, and an estimated 68,000 were receiving financial assistance from the U.S. govern84
ment. During this three year period, an estimated 74,000 Cubans emi85
grated to the U.S. The total number of Cuban refugees nearly doubled as
a result of Castro’s September announcements when he permitted the re86
lease of Cubans with no penalty or consequence, and “opened the fishing
port of Camarioca to all exiles [in the U.S.] wanting to take their relatives
87
from the island.” The sea and weather caused a dangerous combination,
88
and both governments found it necessary to negotiate an accord. The U.S.
agreed to transport nearly 4,000 Cubans per month by air as a continuation
89
of its open arms policy, while Cuba regulated its ports. The “Freedom
Flights” provided a means to reach the safe haven of the U.S. for more than
90
260,000 Cubans over a span of eight years.
The third period was October 1965 – August 1966. After President
Lyndon B. Johnson announced the new policies that governed the arrival of
Cuban refugees, an influx began and nearly 93,000 Cubans settled in the
91
Miami, Florida, area. In general, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare found that the Cubans were “cooperative and worthy, in every
92
respect of our assistance.” Reasons given for these sentiments included

79

See id.
Heike C. Alberts, Changes in Ethnic Solidarity in Cuban Miami, 95 (2) THE GEOGRAPHICAL
REV. 231, 233 (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter Changes].
81 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 50.
82 No Foot, supra note 16, at 441.
83 See Changes, supra note 80, at 234.
84 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 50.
85 No Foot, supra note 16, at 442.
86 See id. at 443.
87 ALEJANDRO PORTES & ALEX STEPICK, CITY ON THE EDGE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MIAMI
103 (University of California Press 1993) [hereinafter Transformation].
88 Changes, supra note 80, at 234-35.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 51.
92 Id. at 52.
80
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the following: excellent adjustment into American communities, good work
record, employers sought them out for employment, and few needed public
93
assistance.
C. Refugees and the law
International refugee law began to take shape in 1921 with the is94
suance of what was known as a “Nansen passport.” Fridtjof Nansen was
the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees of the League of Nations in
95
1921. “The task of the High Commissioner in the legal field was the legal
96
and political protection of refugees.”
In 1950, the United Nations established the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Statute of
UNHCR to develop the functions of predecessor organizations, as well as to
promote international conventions protecting refugees, supervise their ap97
plication, propose amendments, and promote admission of refugees. In
1951, the United Nations adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of
98
Refugees. The Convention is regarded as “the most important internation99
al instrument relating to refugees.” It defines refugees broadly in order to
ensure a universal approach to the Convention and the protection of refu100
gees. The term refugee according to the Convention applies to a person
who:
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, ow101
ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The protections of the Act apply to refugees regardless of their country of
102
origin.

93

See id.
Paul Weis, The Development of Refugee Law, 3 MICH. YBI LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (1982) [hereinafter Refugee Law].
95 Id.
96 Id. (internal quotations ommitted).
97 See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 925.
98 Refugee Law, supra note 94, at 28.
99 Id. at 29.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 31 (citing Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137).
102 Refugee Law, supra note 94, at 29.
94
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Most importantly, Article 33 of the Convention, through the principle
of non-refoulement, restricts expulsion or deportation of refugees. “No
refugee shall . . . be expelled or returned in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
103
group, or political opinion.” The principle of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of refugee law, and has risen to the level of general principle of
104
law, customary international law, and jus cogens.
More specifically, as
jus cogens, the principle of non-refoulement and Article 33 of the Convention are a “mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted. A peremptory norm can be modified only
105
by a later norm that has the same character.”
On January 31, 1967, the U.S. ratified the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, a broader version of the Convention that removes the Jan106
Contracting states of the
uary 1, 1951 date from the refugee definition.
Protocol apply the substantive provisions and refugee definition in the Con107
However, nothing in
vention with the omission of the January 1, 1951.
the Convention or Protocol “requires any nation to admit overseas refugees
108
in the first place.” The Convention and Protocol allow for the exclusion
of certain persons from protection: persons resettled elsewhere and certain
109
criminals. What has ensued are certain exclusions that “nullify the protection against refoulement . . . [and] render the entire Convention inopera110
tive.”
When President Clinton ordered the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept
Haitians attempting to reach the U.S. by sea and to return them to Haiti
without determining their qualification as refugees, the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc., held that Article
111
33 had not been violated because it did not apply to the situation. According to the Court, “the text and negotiating history of Article 33 . . . are
both completely silent with respect to the Article’s possible application to
actions taken by a country outside its own borders . . . . [B]oth the text and
the negotiating history . . . affirmatively indicate that it was not intended to
112
have extraterritorial effect.” The respondents argued that the words “any
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 31.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
See Refugee Law, supra note 94, at 31.
See id.
See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 926.
See id.
See id.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
Id. at 178-79.
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alien” and “return” are not limited to aliens within the U.S., but the Court
found that “return” had a narrower legal meaning compared to its common
114
meaning.
The majority expressly acknowledged that the drafters of the Convention and Protocol may not have contemplated a contracting state “gather[ing] fleeing refugees and return[ing] them to the one country they had
115
desperately sought to escape.”
The majority expressly stated that such
116
117
action may “violate the spirit of Article 33,” but it was not persuaded.
118
Justice Blackmun, however, was compelled to dissent. He believed any
119
expelling or return (refoulement) is a violation of Article 33. “The terms
are unambiguous. Vulnerable refugees shall not be returned. The language
is clear, and the command is straightforward; that should be the end of the
inquiry. Indeed, until litigation ensued, the Government consistently ac120
knowledged that the Convention applied on the high seas.”
The UNHCR supervises the implementation of the Convention and
121
cooperation of the contracting states. Unfortunately, neither the Convention nor other sources of international law give the UNHCR the power to
122
compel or issue binding interpretations. In the U.S., no statute authorizes
123
the admission of refugees. Instead, Congress has occasionally passed ad
hoc legislation to deal with specific crises, i.e., Cubans who left Cuba after
Fidel Castro assumed power, rather than addressing possible violations of
124
international law.
The Convention and the Protocol are the most important instruments
regarding refugees, but they are not the only treaties that afford refugees
125
broad rights and protections. The Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen
was adopted on November 11, 1957, and extends protection to seamen who
126
It
are “in the absence of documents, frequently unable to go on land.”
requires contracting states to issue travel documents to refugee seamen who
are linked to the contracting states either through previous residence, previous travel documents, or service on a ship carrying a contracting state’s

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 170.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 183.
Id. at 188-208.
See id. at 189-190.
Id. at 191.
See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 926.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Refugee Law, supra note 94, at 31-32.
Id. at 32.
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127

flag.
The U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
September 28, 1954, protects refugees who are not considered to be nationals of any state, thus extending protection to stateless persons who are not
128
covered by the 1951 Convention. The U.N. Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness, August 28, 1961, helps stateless refugees acquire nationali129
The U.N. Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance and
ty.
Protocol No. 1 to the Universal Copyright Convention also extend benefits
130
specifically designed for refugees.
In 1980, Congress was led to pass the first comprehensive refugee leg131
islation in U.S. history.
The Refugee Act of 1980 is the principal U.S.
132
statutory law governing overseas refugees. It provides the first domestic
133
definition of refugee, requiring “persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par134
ticular social group, or political opinion.” In what appeared to be a step
in the right direction for refugees wishing to reach the U.S., the 1980 Act
deleted all ideological and geographical limitations from the refugee defini135
tion. However, the courts have narrowed the definition in various ways,
136
and refugees, such as Haitians, continue to be refouled to their home
country.
D. Criticisms from 1966
137

The CAA did not pass without some criticism. Some House Representatives were concerned with allowing too many Cubans to enter the
138
United States in a short period of time. According to these conservative

127

Id.
Id.
129 See id.
130 See id.; The Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, May 25, 1957, 268 U.N.T.S.
3 (facilitating the establishment and execution of claims of maintenance); Protocol No. 1 of the Universal Copyright Convention, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (assimilating refugees and stateless persons to the nationals of their country of habitual residence as regarded by
copyright laws).
131 See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 928.
132 See id.; Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)).
133 See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 929.
134 Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 132; Legomsky, supra note 20, at 929.
135 See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 929.
136 See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 947-49. In the congressional committee notes that accompanied the Refugee Act of 1980, the committee assumed, as the Board does in Acosta, that persecution
means a threat to the life or freedom, or the infliction of suffering or harm that is more than offensive.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, 235 (BIA 1985) (“an alien seeking to meet the definition of a
refugee must do more than show a well-founded fear of persecution in a particular place or abode within
a country—he must show that the threat of persecution exists for him country-wide”).
137 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 31.
138 See id.
128
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Representatives, they were trying as best they could to “protect the rights –
that is, the job rights—of our own people, and particularly our southern
139
colored people.” The more liberal countered by pointing to the fact that
the country’s unemployment rate was at its lowest ever, but Rep. Arch Al140
fred, Jr. from West Virginia responded to the liberals:
Sure we have a low rate of unemployment, but I remind my colleagues that we have 500,000 men . . . in South Vietnam, and we are
experiencing the largest draft call we have ever had in any period of
time . . . . So as we consider this legislation let’s keep [the war and
141
the unemployment rate] in mind.
Rep. Arch Alfred, Jr. warned the Committee of the return of American soldiers from Vietnam, and their need for jobs.
Today’s most forthcoming concern was foreshadowed by Rep. Moore.
He wondered whether another group would factually fit the mold of Cubans
142
and what would happen to them?
He asked the Attorney General,
“[w]ould you feel free to make parole available on any set of fact which
143
you might want to characterize as being refugee in character?” Essentially, Rep. Moore was asking whether persons similarly situated to Cuban
refugees would receive the same special treatment. The Attorney General
responded:
It seems to me it would be foolish for me to flatly predict there could
not be another situation. I don’t foresee one. I don’t know of any. I
would hope to goodness there is not going to be another Castro kind
of situation within this hemisphere. I don’t foresee one. I don’t think
it will occur, but would say this: If you have the same kinds of facts
that we have had with respect to Cuba, then I would suppose that we
would do the same thing and feel that this was exercising the power in
144
the public interest, but I don’t foresee that.
145

The Attorney General’s predictions were not accurate.
The conservative Representatives had a problem with the “administrative liberalization of parole,” i.e., the extension of the law with regards to
139

Id. (statement of Rep. Chelf).
See id. at 32-33.
141 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
142 Id.
143 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 32-33.
144 Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
145 See Pierre M. Atlas, U.S. Must Change Policies That Harm Haitians, Cubans, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Oct. 6, 2005, at A12 “[T]hanks . . . in part to U.S. policies, Haiti is in many ways worse off than
Cuba. The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti is rife with armed gangs, a corrupt government and ineffective United Nations peacekeepers.” Id. The U.S. government should “care about
people and not just ideologies. Lifting the outdated sanctions against Cuba and supporting genuine
democracy in Haiti could be a start.” Id.
140
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refugees in a manner that favored a group at the discretion of the Attorney
146
General. The Attorney General was continuously questioned on the matter, but in the end, Rep. Moore disclosed that the reasoning behind the questioning was only to “determine how far this might be . . . stretched to accomplish anyone of a number of ends . . . . I just made the observation so
that he might know that there are some of us in the Congress just wondering
147
how far this . . . could possibly go. . . . ” Apparently, from the tone of the
Representatives and the line of questioning, Congress appeared to be willing to grant this one time exemption to Cubans, but it was hoping to not
deal with this or any other refugee group claim in the future. Nevertheless,
three months after the Hearings, H.R. 15183, the Cuban Refugee Adjust148
ment Act of 1966, was enacted into law.
E. The Underpinnings of the Hearings
One fact mentioned at length throughout all three days of Congressional Hearings focused on the Cubans’ length of stay. The bill passed under the expectation that the majority of refugees would return to Cuba once
149
freedom reigned on the island. The Subcommittee also did not expect the
150
Not only did the Subcommittee expect that
Castro regime to survive.
Communism would fail in Cuba, they also expected the paroled refugees to
151
return to Cuba. The Hon. Ball, in a statement to the Subcommittee, mentioned that once Cuba was free again, “the status of the Cubans as residents
and parolees would in no way affect their freedom to return to their native
152
land.”
Later during the Hearings, the Hon. Ball further mentioned that
the U.S., through passage of the bill, only “extend[ed] the option [of adjustment] to those who want it . . . . [E]ven though at some time in the future, when Cuba does become free—because I am certain it will—some of
153
them may wish to go back and resume their life there.”
A dialogue between Rep. Robert Thomas Cahill from New Jersey and
the Hon. Ball ensued on this issue.
Rep. Cahill: Don’t you think the efforts that will pave the way for
eventual American citizenship will be a deterrent rather than an incentive for them to return to Cuba?

146

Hearings, supra note 28, at 40.
Id.
148 Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255).
149 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 53.
150 See id. at 5.
151 See id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 14 (alteration in original).
147
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Hon. Ball: I wouldn’t think so because the reasons that would lead
them to return to Cuba is that love of country which I think you will
find is very deep among most Cubans. They want to go back to Cuba.
They want to rebuild their country and they will do so when the opportunity –
Rep. Cahill: Then why should we grant these people American citizenship?
....
Rep. Cahill: . . . [I]sn’t there some other way of doing this besides
granting of citizenship?
....
....
....
Rep. Cahill: This legislation would be open-ended, would it not; there
would be no termination, and there could be unlimited number.
....
Rep. Cahill: Therefore, it seems to me that the Cuban refugees . . .
will love the way we live and won’t want to go back to their native
land. We are really closing our eyes to reality if we expect that these
people will return to the conditions from which they have come . . . .
A great deal of thought . . . should be given to [the bill] because we
are indeed, in my judgment, setting a precedent which will have far154
reaching effects in the future.
The Representative from New Jersey was correct, but his concern with setting precedent was never realized because Congress has refused to extend
155
the same preferential treatment to other similarly situated refugees. Per-

154

Id. at 18-19.
See No Foot, supra note 16, at 454; Legomsky, supra note 20, at 610-611. There have been
other forms of special treatment of non-citizens, but not of the kind extended to Cubans through the
CAA. Id. In 1997, Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub.
L. 105-100, Title II, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(2006)) (NACARA). It provided two kinds of relief. Certain nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, and
the former U.S.S.R. received the right to apply for cancellation of removal, a form of immigration relief,
under less rigorous substantive requirements. NACARA, Pub. L. 105-100, Title II, 111 Stat. 2160, 2197
(1997). The second form of relief was a grant of amnesty to Nicaraguans and Cubans who had been
continuously physically present in the United States since December 1, 1995. Id. at 2193. If the requirements were met under this second form of relief, the Attorney General was required to adjust their
status. Id. NACARA left a gap, however, for Haitians who needed it as much as the above-mentioned
groups. Congress in 1998 enacted the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, Pub. L. 105-277, Title
IX, 112 Stat. 2681-538 (1998) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)) (HRIFA). Like
NACARA, HRIFA provided adjustment of status for certain Haitians who had resided in the United
155
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haps Rep. Cahill’s true concern was not with setting a precedent, but having
to regularly replicate a pro-refugee decision in the future.
F. An Image Change
The Congressional Hearings provided a romantic image of the Cuban
156
immigrant—the model minority.
They had been characterized as hard
157
working professionals who were an asset to American communities.
However, this image changed in 1980. In April of 1980, a group of Cubans
seeking political asylum crashed a bus through the gates of the Peruvian
158
The Peruvian government refused to hand over the
embassy in Cuba.
159
Cubans at the request of the Cuban government. In response, Fidel Castro announced that any Cuban who wished to leave Cuba should assemble
160
at the Peruvian embassy. An estimated 10,000 men, women and children
squeezed into the embassy faster than negotiations with third party states
161
initiated. Meanwhile, Cuban exiles in the U.S. began to prepare a mas162
sive boatlift. Fidel Castro once again opened a port in Cuba, and caused
163
an exodus of Cuban immigration in the U.S.
The 1980 “Freedom Flotilla” consisted of Cuban exiles in the U.S.
164
venturing by boat to the port of Mariel, Cuba, to pick up their relatives.
“In May 1980, the boatlift was at its height. More than 16,000 refugees
arrived in one six-day period alone. “By the time the 159-day exodus
ended on Sept. 26, 1980, nearly 125,000 Cuban refugees escaped to the
165
United States.” Boats of ex-immigrants returned to Cuba to help Cubans
166
escape, but this time the U.S. was not receiving boat loads of professionals. Castro sent the U.S. what he described as the scum of his country, i.e.,
167
Almost
antisocialist, homosexuals, drug addicts, and gambling addicts.
States since December 31, 1995 and applied for asylum or had been paroled before that date. HRIFA,
Pub. L. 105-277, Title IX, 112 Stat. 2681-538 (1998) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)).
NACARA and HRIFA are steps in the right direction, but they apply to aliens present in the United
States before 1995. The CAA applies to Cubans who arrived in the United States for a period before
1959, and all those after. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255) (1966).
156 See The Other, supra note 15, at 690-91.
157 See id. at 691.
158 Changes, supra note 80, at 237.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See Transformation, supra note 87, at 18.
164 See id. at 20.
165 E.A. Torreiro & Luisa Yanez, From Mariel to Miami Cuban Refugees Changed the Face of
South Florida, SUN-SENTINEL, May 21, 1995, at 1A.
166 See id. (“Cuban-Americans spent more than $1 million to charter boats to pick up relatives,” in
a flotilla that stretched 90 miles from Key West, Florida, to Mariel, Cuba, and back.).
167 See Transformation, supra note 87, at 21.
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half of the new arrivals had criminal backgrounds that ranged from theft,
possession of drugs, fraud, and crimes against the normal development of
168
sexual relations. The influx caused then President Jimmy Carter to take
steps contrary to the spirit of the CAA, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
speech, and the thoughts expressed during the 1966 Congressional Hear169
ings. The boats carrying refugees were ordered to be stopped and seized.
The arrival of these Cubans coincided with a departure from the political outlook toward Cuban immigrants. “Until 1980, Cuban exile politics
had focused on the idea of returning to the island,” however, the new exodus in addition to a lack of imminent diplomatic change in Cuba, led to the
170
realization that the Cuban exiles intended to stay in the U.S.
Nevertheless, the 1980 group of Cubans received the same treatment as the group
171
The Carter administration’s Open
that immigrated in the late 1960s.
Hearts and Open Arms Policy relied on the CAA as it allowed the Cuban
immigrants to find refuge from political persecution in Cuba and seek asy172
lum in the U.S.
More change in the treatment of Cubans resulted as Castro attempted
to repeat the events of 1980. In 1994, Castro once again pried open the exit
doors of Cuba to those wishing to take flight; however, this group was dis173
similar to both previous groups. Unlike the first two groups, the majority
this time set sail on rafts made of inner tubes, boxes, planks of wood, and
174
any floating material that could be tied together. Not only did they arrive
in a different manner in comparison to the predecessor groups, but they also
175
received different immigration treatment from the U.S. government.
In August of 1994, President Bill Clinton and Cuba opened diplomatic
176
discussion with the goal of “defusing the refugee crises.”
The Clinton
Administration took the position that Cubans were risking their lives at sea
177
on rafts, and thus the Cuban government should stop the exit flow. The
168 See id. at 20; Torreiro, supra note 165, at 1A (stating that the refugees were labeled criminals).
“The perception that they were all criminals . . . is Mariel’s most misunderstood legacy.” Id. Castro
perhaps caused this misperception in a May 1980 speech, calling those who left Cuba, “the scum of the
country.” Id. By the end of summer 1980, some Marielitos contributed to the misconception. Id.
Crime in Miami had increased; “robberies up 775 percent; burglaries up 191 percent; homicides up 66
percent.” Id. Years later, experts have dubbed the increase in criminal activity as “an aberration caused
by desperate refugees trying to survive.” Id. Nearly half of the Cuban refugees that arrived during the
Mariel did have criminal records, but most turned out to be political crimes. Id.
169 See Transformation, supra note 87, at 22.
170 See id. at 27.
171 See No Foot, supra note 16, at 445.
172 See id.
173 See Flight, supra note 17, at 58.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 Steven Greenhouse, Clinton Will Open Talks With Cuba on Refugee Crises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 1994, at 2. (the immigration only issue of the New York Times).
177 See id.
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U.S. now sent a new message to Cubans who wished to reach the U.S.
178
“The boat people would not be admitted.” Roughly 12,000 Cubans were
intercepted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard, and on August 19, 1994, President Clinton “reversed longstanding policy and ordered that the boat people
be barred from the United States and instead be taken to Guantánamo Bay
179
However, the agreement to completely stop
[U.S. Naval Base, Cuba].”
180
the flow of immigration to the U.S. was not successful.
G. Fidel Castro’s View
181

According to Castro, “this is the killer Cuban Adjustment Act.” “It
is a perverse policy, deliberately conceived to destabilize and suffocate Cuban society, cynically calculated to provoke death and suffering, shameless182
Cubans are encourly manipulating the tragedies that this law causes.”
183
aged to immigrate illegally and place their lives in danger.
Further, the
184
Act is to blame for the international custody battle of Elian Gonzalez.
The CAA is a form of political ammunition for his enemies “who describe
the migrants as desperate boat people fleeing their communist homeland for
185
freedom.”
For support, Cuban leaders point to Haitians and Domini186
These groups seek the same opportunities in America as Cubans,
cans.
187
but they are not allowed to stay. “In a colossal operation of falsification .
. . and promotion of lies, [the U.S.] has tried to present Cubans as people
who want to ‘escape’ to North America, and that the United States as a ‘generous’ nation receives them. [That argument] doesn’t contain an atom of
188
truth.”

178

See id. at 13.
See id.
180 See Tim Golden, Cuba’s Hidden Gain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1994, at 4.
181 Anita Snow, Cuban Assembly Condemns Law, MIAMI HERALD, Jul. 13, 2000, at A12.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.; See Key Figures in the Elian Gonzalez Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 23, 2000, at
A4. On November 25, 2000, Elian Gonzlez, a 6-year old Cuban national, was found adrift on an inner
tube off the Florida coast. Id. His mother and others died in the sea voyage. Id. Elian became the
subject of an international standoff between his father in Cuba and Miami relatives. Id. After his Miami
family refused to hand him over, an extremely media publicized raid took place, after which Elian was
returned to his father and Cuba. Id.
185 Snow, supra note 181, at A12.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. (alteration in original).
179
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III. ANALYSIS – THE CUBAN ADJUSTMENT ACT TODAY
A. The Wet Foot, Dry Foot Policy
Cuban immigrants who seek to invoke their special privileges under
the CAA must now rely on an immigration legislation anomaly. The significance of the 1994 agreement between the Cuban government and Clinton
Administration is that when coupled with the CAA, those Cuban immigrants who are captured at sea are returned to Cuba, but those who reach
189
American soil may invoke their rights under the CAA. The anomaly has
190
come to be known as the Wet Foot, Dry Foot Policy.
The struggle to reach the U.S. now extends beyond the rigorous and
life-threatening voyage through the 90 mile straight between the U.S. and
191
Cuba. Today, the highest drama takes place on the beaches of South Flor192
ida.
“Cubans try almost anything, including threatened self-immolation
and suicide, to hold off the Coast Guard long enough to put at least a foot
193
Cuban mothers have gone as far as threatening to drown
on dry sand.”
194
their own children if Coast Guard members come too close. Altercations
195
are numerous, and guaranteed to continue in the future. Therefore, “the
politics of applying migration law have to be revised to become more hu-

189

See No Foot, supra note 16, at 445.
See id.
191 See Rick Bragg, Cubans Now Choosing Smugglers Over Rafts, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 1999, at 1.
192 See id.
193 Id.
194 See id.
195 See id.; Cuban Immigrants Land in So. Florida, UPI NEWSTRACK, Jan. 21, 2007 (27 Cuban
immigrants land on an island near Key Biscayne, Florida; however, earlier in January 2007, 91 refugees
were captured at sea and returned to Cuba); Cuban Landing Shows Security Flaw, WORLD, Jan. 2, 2007
(25 Cubans were found huddled on the beach of Beer Can Island off the west coast of Florida); Immigration Issues: Cubans Make It to the United States, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 29 , 2006, at A22 (15
Cubans reached an abandoned portion of the Old Seven Mile Bridge in the Florida Keys. They were
wrongfully repatriated as U.S. immigration officials claims the bridge did not constitute dry land under
the Wet Foot, Dry Foot Policy. Months later, 6 of the wrongfully repatriated Cubans did the impossible
— “they made another perilous escape to the United States, this time being admitted.”); Joel Maroney,
Cuban Boats No Surprise—Marco Landing of 20 Refugees Comes With Local Officials Watching Layout
Space, NEWS-PRESS, Aug. 16, 2006, at A1 (20 Cubans land on the shores of Marco Island, Florida. The
small island off the west coast of Florida is accustomed to these arrivals, but authorities mention that
they are not the first in line for Cuban refugees. The Florida Keys are only 90 miles from Cuba, and are
the more logical choice of destination. The seas are difficult to navigate, so refugees often mist their
intended marks); Madeline Baro Diaz, Family In Floating Cab Ask to be Let Into U.S., S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL, Jun. 9, 2005, at B1 (a Cuban family tried to float to Florida on a vintage vehicle-turned boat.
The family had applied for exit visa, but one was denied because she was a doctor and another because
he was old enough for military service); Copter Flies 34 Cubans to Freedom Asylum-Seekers Land Near
Miami After Commandeering Craft in Daring Escape Plot, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 4, 1992, at 2
(34 Cubans commandeered a tourist helicopter and flew from a resort in Varadero, Cuba, at low heights
to avoid Cuban radars, to the U.S. At least on one other occasion, a Cuban major flew a Mig fighter jet
to the U.S. Cubans have also flown small crop-duster planes to the U.S.).
190
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196

mane.” Change in Cuba does not appear to be imminent, and Cubans will
continue to risk their lives in hopes of setting foot on American soil and
197
invoking the CAA.
B. Comparing the Concerns Voiced During the 1966 Congressional Hearings and the Current State of Cuban Affairs and Immigration Policy
The current diplomatic situation between the U.S. and Cuba is inade198
quate. In the past, when confronted with various exoduses of Cuban immigrants, Congress held Congressional Hearings or discussions with the
199
government of Cuba. Today, Cuba and the U.S. continue to be at a dip200
lomatic stalemate. In light of the diplomatic silence and the current anomaly posed by the Wet Foot, Dry Foot policy, I offer a foreshadowing of
196 Bragg, supra note 191 (statement of Ramon Saul Sanchez, delegate with Movimiento Democracia, a Miami based anti-Castro group).
197 Growing up Cuban in Miami, Florida, you develop a thick skin against news from the island
because rumors about change in Cuba are constantly presented and proven to be untrue. See Vanessa
Arrington, From Appendicitis to Poisoned Cigars, Fidel Castro Has Repeatedly Defied Death,
ASSOCIATED PRESS ARCHIVE, Aug. 6, 2006. In 1961, the C.I.A. trained Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs
invasion and Castro’s assassination. Id. Nearly 150 Cubans were killed, but Castro was unharmed. Id.
There have been more than 30 plots to assassinate Castro. Id. All of which were unsuccessful. Id.
With each attempt or illness, hope of a better future rises. Id. With each failed attempt or recovery,
hope slips away. Id. “Cubans have no idea whether dictator Fidel Castro is lying at death’s door or
sitting up and watching reruns of ‘Jeopardy.’” Stephanie Mansfield, Cubans in Dark on Fate of Fidel –
Parallel Noted in Soviet Deaths, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at A01. Cubans in Cuba and the U.S.
were left wondering what had happened to Castro. Id. In Miami, they awaited news of Castro’s death
with champagne, beeping car horns, and Cuban flags. Id. Expectations once again proved to be untrue.
Id. For example, rumors about Castro’s death caused uproars of celebration in the Cuban enclaves of
South Florida, but once again, like so many times before, possible change in Cuba turned out to be a
hoax. See After Fidel Miami Smartly Reconsiders Post-Castro Event, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 3,
2007, at A18.
198 See Pablo Bachelet & Frances Robles, Cuba Cuts Power to U.S. Mission, MIAMI HERALD, Jun.
13, 2006, at A1. “Electricity to the U.S. Interests section—not quite an embassy because Cuba and the
United States do not have formal diplomatic relations—was cut off at 3 a.m. on June 5, [2006].” Id.
The electricity incident was another event in what has been a “dramatic escalation of a campaign of
harassment of American diplomats that allegedly includes poisoning a family pet and shutting off water.” Id. Other examples of harassment on the part of Cuba officials include the following: not awarding visas to newly appointed U.S. diplomats; denying requests for transportation, computers, and other
supplies; preventing the hiring of Cuban maintenance workers; restricting gasoline access; and denying
exit permits to Cuban employees who need training abroad. Id.
199 See Hearings, supra note 28.
200 Bob Deans, U.S. Relations With Cuba Ripe For Thaw With a Democratic Majority, Those Who
Favor Closer Ties See Opportunity to Reverse Strict Bush Policy, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
Feb. 4, 2007, at A18. The former Republican controlled House and Senate have been hesitant to challenge restrictions on Cuba. Id. “Conservative Cuban-Americans in South Florida have long been active
in pressuring Washington and flexing their political muscle within the GOP to maintain sanction on
Cuba.” Id. However, with the new Democratic control of the House and Senate, some sanctions may be
challenged. Id. Some argue that common sense leans toward the creation of a strong relationship with
Cuba. Id. “Whether we like or dislike, or agree or disagree, with the government there,” said Rep. Ray
LaHood (R-Ill). Id. Others counter by calling any potential lift of sanctions against Cuba as a victory
for Castro. Id. To many, the sanctions “remain[] a powerful symbol of U.S. opposition to Castro.” Id.
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what Congressional Hearings on the state of Cuban affairs and immigration
policy would appear like in 2008. Comparing the remarks and concerns of
the representatives present at the 1966 Hearings prove useful to understanding the growing concern over the current preferential treatment of Cubans.
The following is a selection of the issues raised in 1966 followed by modern hypothetical responses.
According to the 1966 Hearings, the CAA was passed to improve the
plight of the thousands of Cubans who left Cuba because of the oppression
201
faced at the hands of a communist Cuban government. The U.S. desired
to play a “full and sympathetic role” as a home for refugees from a com202
munist government.
Today, there have been no significant changes in the approach the Cu203
ban government takes in controlling life in Cuba. The totalitarian regime
controls all aspects of life in Cuba through pressure from the Communist
204
Party. “The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies
205
citizens the right to change their government.”
Cuban nationals are incarcerated for manifesting their political beliefs, and though the Cuban constitution provides for freedom of speech, all speech must conform to social206
207
ist thought. “The government does not tolerate dissent.” In 2006, ha208
rassment and intimidation of critics and dissidents increased. At least 67
“prisoners of conscience” —teachers, journalists, human rights defenders—
are imprisoned throughout Cuba after unfair trials that do not meet interna209
tional standards. All print and media are under control of the state. Inter210
net access is severely limited.
211
Nor does governmental change appear to be imminent. According to
a poll conducted in 2004 by the Institute for Public Opinion Research and
Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, 16% of Cu212
ban-Americans polled felt that political change will never occur in Cuba.
In light of the above-mentioned facts, the situation in Cuba does not war201

See Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of the Hon. George Ball).
Id. at 4.
203 See id.
204 See id.
205 Id.
206 See id.; Amnesty International Raps Cuba on Human Rights, EFE NEWS SERVICES, Jan. 29,
2007 [hereinafter Amnesty International] (according to Amnesty International, the government of Cuba
continues to commit assorted abuses of human rights, such as the imprisonment of political dissidents
and severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly).
207 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Events, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/.
208 See Amnesty International, supra note 206.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. (as of late January 2007, reports indicate that Cuba continues to fail international standards
of human rights).
212 See
Florida
International
University
Cuba
Poll,
http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/ipor/cubapoll/index.html. [hereinafter The Cuba Poll].
202
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rant abolishment of the CAA; rather, because Cubans in Cuba continue to
face oppression by the Cuban government, the adjustment of status Con213
gress has granted Cubans via the CAA is justified and upheld.
According to the 1966 Hearings, the only means to obtain a visa was if
a Cuban who had arrived in the U.S. left the country and applied at an
214
Since diplomatic ties with Cuba were seAmerican consulate abroad.
vered on January 3, 1961, Cubans cannot apply for an immigration visa
from within Cuba for the sole purpose of acquiring permanent residency in
215
the U.S.
Today, immigration processing from within Cuba is possible, to a li216
mited extent. “Immigration processing in Cuba is regulated by the September 4, 1994, Joint Communique between the U.S. government and the
217
Currently, 20,000 visas are awarded to Cubans
government of Cuba.”
who fall within the following three groups: (1) family based; (2) refugee
protection; and (3) discretionary parole under the Special Cuban Migration
218
Program referred to as the Cuban Lottery. However, an additional procedure employed by the Cuban government complicates an already imperfect
219
system. Cubans must obtain an exit visa before departing from Cuba.
Over 500 applicants who were awarded an exit visa have not been allowed
220
to exit Cuba. Further, Cuba has refused to initiate a new registration for
221
the supposedly annual U.S. visa lottery. The last registration was held in
222
1998.
Efforts to correct the backlog have failed, and since 2003, when a
meeting with the Cuban government was canceled because of its unwillingness to collaborate with the U.S., there have been little communications

213 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (the political oppression that led the Representatives present
at the 1966 Congressional Hearings presently remain in Cuba).
214 Id; Cuban Refugees Seek New Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1966, at 15.
215 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 8.
216 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis.
217 Id.
218 See id.
219 See Oscar Corral, U.S. Says Cuba Not Trying To Halt Migrants, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29,
2005, at 1A [hereinafter U.S. Says Cuba]; Andres Viglucci, Costly Exit Fees Keep Some Cubans From
Using Visas, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9, 1998, at 1A. By 1998, 5,700 of the 42,000 Cubans granted a U.S.
immigration visa had not reached the U.S due to high exit fees. Id. The fees, $500 for adult and $400
for children to be paid in U.S. currency only, are coupled with air travel to the U.S. and mandatory
medical exams. Id. “In some cases, the visas, which are good for six months and renewable for six
months, expire and recipients must reapply.” Id. Some must give up their dream of reaching the U.S.
for lack of money. Id. “There are other impediments as well. In a relatively small number of cases,
mainly involving young men of military service age and relatives of high level defectors, the Cuban
government refuses exit visas.” Id.
220 See U.S. Says Cuba, supra note 219, at 1A.
221 See id.
222 See id.
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223

between the two sides with regards to immigration issues.
In light of
Cuba’s non-cooperation, specifically with the U.S. visa lottery, there is no
reasonable method by which a Cuban in Cuba may apply for a visa to enter
224
the U.S. or a Cuban visa to exit Cuba. The CAA should remain intact as
Cubans are continually forced to risk their lives at sea in order to reach the
225
U.S.
According to the 1966 Hearings, an adverse result of preventing Cubans from receiving permanent residence in the U.S. is that “skilled and
professionally trained individuals who would be a credit to this country are
prevented from obtaining gainful employment [in the U.S.], either because
of conditions imposed independently by employers, or because of restrictive statutes. Enactment of [the CAA] . . . removes many bars to the self226
sufficiency of Cuban refugees.”
Today, many Cuban professionals who would be a credit to American
society are being prevented from gaining access to the United States. For
example, 171 of the estimated 500 Cubans who have been awarded a U.S.
227
visa, but have not been allowed to exit Cuba, are doctors. Cuban doctors,
who wish to leave Cuba for the same reasons non-professionals immigrate,
customarily defected while in a third country; however, this has been diffi228
cult to accomplish. Professionals who perform their trained skills in third
countries are often considered to live in that country, and thus are no longer
229
escaping the oppression at the hands of the Cuban government. An esti230
mated 500 medical personnel have recently defected.
The above mentioned facts taken into consideration, Cuban professionals who would be an
asset to American society are being prevented from gaining access to the
231
U.S.
In an effort to facilitate the admission of these individuals, U.S.
policy “announced in August [2006], enables Cuban medical personnel
working abroad to come to the United States once they passed routine
232
background checks.” In light of this policy and the benefits of permitting
223

See id.
See supra notes 165-172 and accompanying text.
225 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 3. Cubans in 1966 could not apply for a U.S. visa from within
Cuba. Id. Cubans in 2006 are not being granted the U.S. visas they are entitled to under the Joint
Communique. Id.
226 Id. at 9 (statement of the Hon. Emanuel Celler).
227 See U.S. Says Cuba, supra note 219, at 1A.
228 See Alfonso Chardy, U.S. Tweaks Cuba Policy, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 12, 2006, at 1B [hereinafter U.S. Tweaks].
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See Asylum Bid Stalls For 38 Cuban Doctors, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2007, at 9. Thirty-eight
Cuban doctors have defected from a mission in Venezuela, and await refugee status in Venezuela. Id.
They hope to seek asylum in the U.S., but have been waiting a Venezuelan response for 6 months. Id.
232 Id.; Vanessa Bauza, Cuban Troupe Defects in Vegas: 44 Performers of Music Group Seek
Asylum in the U.S., S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 2004, at 1A. Forty-four performers of the Havana
Night Club show took place in large mass defection from Cuba. Id. They feared group disbandment
224
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these individuals to remain in the U.S., the CAA should continue to ensure
at least one avenue that provides professionals such as doctors, nurses, and
233
other needed medical personnel to stay in the U.S.
According to the 1966 Hearings, the efforts taken by the U.S. to welcome the Cuban immigrants are “humanitarian gestures,” and in no way
234
In other words, the
indicate a change in political posture toward Cuba.
CAA in no way is indicative of a direct agreement with the Cuban govern235
ment; rather, it is a form of relief to the Cuban people. The essence of the
American posture toward Cuba is that Cuba one day will return again to the
“free world family of nations,” while the gates to the U.S. remain open to
236
those who wish to flee the oppression of the totalitarian government.
Today, the American stance on Cuba has not changed since the incep237
tion of the CAA in 1966. Cuba and the U.S. continue to have no diplo238
matic relations, and the U.S. embargo continues to restrict trade with Cu239
ban industries. Earlier this year, concern over Cuba grew once again as
the nation wondered—or at least South Florida and other Cuban enclaves—
whether the death of Fidel Castro and the transfer of power to his brother,
240
Raul Castro, would cause diplomatic change on the island. According to
Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “[i]t
is our view that Cuba's future has to be determined by the Cuban people.
That ultimately no political solution can be imposed from the outside, neither from the United States, nor any other country . . . . [I]t’s imperative
241
that the Cuban people be able to choose their future.”
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also spoke to the Cuban people as
the death of Fidel Castro appeared imminent.
Much is changing [in Cuba], yet one thing remains constant: America’s commitment to supporting a future of freedom for Cuba, a future
that will be defined by you—the Cuban people.

after a trip to perform in the U.S.; they filed for political asylum in Las Vegas. Id. “They felt they were
given no choice on the way out the door [of Cuba].” Id.
233 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 9 (Congressional interest in granted adjustment of status via the
CAA to Cuban professionals).
234 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 17.
235 See id.
236 Id.
237 See Pierre M. Atlas, U.S. Must Change Policies That Harm Haitians, Cubans, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Oct. 6, 2005, at A12 [hereinafter U.S. Must Change]. During the Cold War, Cuba and the Soviet
Union marched side-by-side. Id. “Thanks to the 40-year old trade embargo and especially the demise
of the Soviet economic subsidies, Cuba is no longer a threat.” Id. However, though the rationales for
the embargo are no longer convincing, trade with Cuba remains restricted. Id.
238 See Bachelet & Robles, supra note 198, at 1A.
239 See U.S. Must Change, supra note 237, at A12.
240 See Thomas Shannon, Assistant Sec’y of State for W. Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward
Cuba (Aug. 23, 2006), transcript available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/71065.htm.
241 Id. (alteration in original).
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. . . [W]e will stand with you to secure your rights.
. . . [A]nd we stand ready to provide you with humanitarian assistance,
as you begin to chart a new course for your country.
....
It has long been the hope of the United States that a free, independent,
and democratic Cuba would be more than just a close neighbor—it
would be a close friend. This is our goal, now more than ever, and
throughout this time of change, all of you must know that you have no
242
greater friend than the United States of America.
As evidenced by the statements of Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in conjunction with the continuation of
restrictive and limiting U.S. policies toward Cuba such as the embargo, the
furthering of humanitarian aid to Cuban immigrants via the CAA in no way
243
changes the U.S. government’s stance against the totalitarian regime.
According to the 1966 Hearings, Cubans do not intend to reside per244
Once conditions improve in Cuba, the
manently in the United States.
245
immigrants will return to their homes abroad.
Today, a poll conducted in 2004 by the Institute for Public Opinion
Research and Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University
indicates that 46.2% of Cubans polled are not at all likely to return to Cuba
246
if the Cuban government shifts from a totalitarian to a democratic form.
It should come as no surprise that the population of Cubans in the U.S. has
increased since the establishment of the CAA. In 1980, nearly 570,000
247
Cubans called Miami, Florida, their home.
The U.S. Census Bureau’s
248
2000 census indicates that over 833,000 Cubans live in Florida. “Members of the first generation that fled Cuba after Fidel Castro came to power
were always sustained by the dream of one day seeing their homeland free
249
of its Communist government. But in time . . . [t]hey remade themselves
242 Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State Condoleeza Rice Message to the People of Cuba (Aug. 4,
2006) (alteration in original), transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69974.htm.
243 See generally, Hearings, supra note 28, at 17-18 (accepting Cuban immigrants in 1966 as a
humanitarian gesture does not change the overall outlook of the U.S government toward Cuba).
244 See id. at 18; Cuban Refugees Seek Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1966, at 15 (the thousands of
Cubans that filled immigration offices in 1966, just after enactment of the CAA, did not all intend to
stay in the U.S. permanently. “They were more interested in the immediate benefits of becoming permanent residents than in seeking citizenship after five years of residency.” Some did not intend to give
up their Cuban citizenship, hoping to return home someday).
245 See id.
246 See The Cuba Poll, supra note 212.
247 See Transformation, supra note 87, at 20.
248 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Selected Population
Group: Cuban.
249 See supra note 195 and accompanying text (describing the hope many Cubans retain of one day
returning to Cuba).

536

FIU Law Review

[3:509

250

and [the cities they live in].” Over time, the Cuban immigrants have settled in the U.S. and have realized that they and their children cannot pack
up and leave the U.S. for a country they either left decades ago or have
251
never known.
The reality for many Cuban immigrants “is that home is
252
here now.” It has become evident that Cubans who arrive in the U.S. and
adjust their immigration status through the CAA are not contemplating a
253
temporary stay in the U.S.
According to the 1966 Hearings, Cuban immigrants prefer to settle in
254
the U.S., “particularly the Miami area and Florida.” Americans and Cubans know one another through tourist excursions and business expe255
riences. Cubans have visited the Miami area and other parts of the U.S.
256
on holidays, and “know this part of the world.” “[Cubans] know how to
257
live with Americans.” Additionally, Central and South Americans have
258
less in common with Cubans than do Americans.
The Spanish that is
spoken in some Latin American countries is different from that spoken in
Cuba, and we must not underestimate the diversity between Latin America
259
and Cuba.
Today, Argentina shares a close relationship with the people of Cuba
260
because of the honored and beloved icon Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Boli261
via is another ally of Cuba in South America.
Arguably, Cuba has no

250 David Gonzalez and Abby Goodnough, Cubans in U.S. Feel the Tug of Two Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at A1 (hereinafter Tug of Two Homes).
251 See Bill Steigerwald, What’s Next For Cuba After Castro?, THE JERSEY JOURNAL, Aug. 14,
2006, at A17 (“You’re not talking about exiles who arrived a year ago. You’re talking about thousands
of people who came in more than 40 years ago. They married here. They have children. Their children
married here. There are folks who have spent two generations in the United States. They are elected to
Congress, they pay taxes, they serve in the armed forces. I’m sure that some Cuban-Americans will go
back to stay in Cuba and many others will go back to visit. But I think a large percentage of Cubans
now living in the United States after Castro is gone are going to discover that they see themselves more
like Irish-Americans in Boston or American Jews in New York or German-Americans in the Pittsburgh
area.”) (statement of Frank Calzon, executive director of the Center for a Free Cuba—an independent,
non-partisan institution dedicated to promoting human rights and a transition to democracy and the rule
of law on the island of Cuba).
252 See Tug of Two Homes, supra note 250.
253 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 18.
254 Id. at 24; Kevin Manahan, Away From Big Game, Boos for Castro, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 5,
2007, at 1 (“Miami is home to more than a million Cuban-Americans, and last week a citizens’ committee announced plans to celebrate Castro’s death with a party at the Orange Bowl. Let your spite be your
invitation.”).
255 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 24.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See id. at 25.
259 See id. at 24.
260 See Monte Real, In Latin America, A Warm Spotlight for Socialist Icon, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2006, at A8.
261 See id.
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262

greater ally than Venezuela. Cuba, as part of an agreement with Venezuela, sends doctors, teachers, and sports instructors to Venezuela in return for
263
More recently, Cuba and Venezuela
over 50,000 barrels of oil per day.
agreed with Bolivia to buy all of Bolivia’s soy beans in exchange for access
264
265
to Bolivian oil. Additionally, Cuba remains a powerful ally of Mexico,
266
while the U.S. continues its non-diplomatic relationship with Cuba. Cubans who wish to find refuge from the oppressive Castro government do
267
have alternatives in Central and South America.
The comfort level of
Cubans in these countries is high, as is the opportunity of sustaining a life
268
Bolivia, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela are Spanishof quality.
269
speaking countries with ties to Cuba and large metropolitan centers.
While Cubans may prefer to immigrate to the U.S., the historical relationship that once existed between Cuba and the U.S. is no more, and Cuba and
the previously mentioned Central and South American countries are now
270
closely tied together.
The above-mentioned hypothetical responses to the concerns from the
1966 Hearings are similar for the most part to those given in 1966. Cubans
271
remain oppressed; the formal process for receiving access to the United
272
States is inadequate; professionals are being prevented access to the Unit273
274
ed States; and the American stance on Cuba has not changed. However,
at least two of the rationales for passing the CAA no longer carry the same
weight. Exiled Cubans in the U.S. do not ultimately intend to return to Cu275
ba; and, arguably, Cubans prefer to live in South and Central America

262 See Magdalena Morales, Chávez Cultivating Cuban Idea, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003, at
A17 (Cuban instructors have offered farming lessons to Venezuelens as part of “Cuba’s latest export to
its closest South American ally, Venezuela.” The farming lessons have been criticized as “little more
than a political gimmick and another sign of Chávez’s close ideological ties with his friend and ally
Cuban President Fidel Castro.”).
263 See The Americas: Another Cuba?; Venezuela, THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 47.
264 See Anita Snow, Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela Ink Alternative Trade Agreement, BOSTON HAITIAN
REPORTER, May 2002, at 22.
265 See Robert S. Leiken, With a Friend Like Fox, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 91.
266 See Pablo Bachelet & Frances Robles, Cuba Cuts Power to U.S. Mission, MIAMI HERALD, Jun.
13, 2006, at 1A.
267 See supra notes 210-216 and accompanying text.
268 See Rodrigo Lazo, Promise of Help Still Good, Cubans in Venezuela are Told, MIAMI HERALD,
June 16, 1989, at 4B (Cubans have settled in Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Spain. Many see their
time in these countries as temporary stops on their voyage to the U.S.; however, the possibility for
prosperity outside of the U.S. for Cubans exists).
269 See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 210-19 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
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276

over the U.S. The majority of the rationales support the continued use of
the CAA, but with a minority of rationales no longer supporting the CAA,
the debate over the continued use of the CAA has grown.
IV. COMMENTARY - THE FUTURE OF THE CAA
A. Continued Preferential Treatment of Cubans
One man felt so passionate about the current state of U.S.-Cuba relations, or the lack thereof, that in January 2006, after 15 Cuban refugees
277
were sent back to Cuba, he went on an eleven-day hunger strike. It ended
only after President Bush agreed to meet with Cuban exile leaders to dis278
This event—to some—exemplifies
cuss Cuban immigration policies.
America’s stance on the fair treatment of immigrants; however,
[t]he allusion is far from reality. It would be more fitting to say that
[the U.S. is] very concerned about fair immigration practices only
when it comes to the Cuban exile community. For it has been many
years that Haitian refugees have been neglected and even mistreated
279
by U.S. immigration policy.
Over forty years after the CAA became law, preferential treatment of the
kind solely demonstrated toward Cuban immigrants may no longer be a
280
reasonable practice of American immigration policies.
At least one possible future for Cuba is consistent with the concerns
281
voiced during the 1966 Congressional Hearings. Raul Castro’s takeover
of Cuba likely will be reminiscent of Communist China as indicated by a
number of trips he has made to China since 2003 to study Chinese econom282
ic polices.
This likely opens Cuba to some economic change, but also
supplies the government with a “more forceful hand in denying human

276

See supra notes 204-20 and accompanying text.
See Isheka Harrison, Asylum Policies Outrageous, MIAMI TIMES, Jan. 25-31, 2006, 1A.
278 See id.
279 Id. (alteration in original).
280 See Maura Possley, Cuban Policy Sparks Cries of Inequity – Critics Seek Fairness in Controversy Over ‘Wet Foot, Dry Foot’, BRADENTON HERALD, Dec. 20, 2006, at 1A (the disparity created by
pro-Cuban policies “points to a desperate need for equity in U.S. immigration laws.” Most immigrants
who attempt to reach the U.S. face similar strife, but only Cubans receive the special treatment. The
critics are not anti-Cuban or anti-immigration; rather, they seek fair policies toward all immigrants. On
the other hand, some view the critics, especially those Latino or Hispanic critics, as traitors, but no other
country in the world receives this treatment from U.S. immigration. It appears to not follow any logic.
Immigrants are jealous of the sensitive favoritism. It just doesn’t make sense to choose between groups
of immigrants when all these groups are assemblies of persons suffering from similar strife).
281 See supra notes 152-220 (referring to the concerns from 1966 and the modern day responses of
2006-2007).
282 See George Diaz, New ‘Jefe’ Same as Old ‘Jefe’, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE NEWS, Nov. 19,
2006, at 1.
277
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283

rights.” The standard of living for the average Cuban remains lower today compared to life in Cuba prior to 1990, when Cuba’s paternalistic ally,
284
the Soviet Union, collapsed. As a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse,
285
about $6 billion were lost annually.
Cubans have been left with so few
286
options that many hunt and eat the cats off the street.
Further, the deficiencies in nutrition have caused an epidemic of optic neuropathy, resulting
287
in temporary blindness.
288
Strife in Cuba is in part due to U.S. policies, i.e., the embargo. Economic sanctions and the embargo against Cuba perhaps create a duty to
289
accept Cuban refugees who flee Cuba due to economic decline. The U.S.
has consistently strengthened sanctions against the Cuban government as a
290
means of accelerating democracy on the island. As recently as November
2006, U.S. prosecutors announced the creation of a task force that will increasingly prosecute the import/export of goods to and from Cuba, unap291
proved visits to Cuba, and exchanges of hard currency to and from Cuba.
Cuba has lost an estimated $4 billion in 2006 due to lost business, cancelled
292
contracts, and higher shipping and financial costs.
Nearly every U.N.
member nation currently opposes the U.S. embargo on Cuba, but the Bush
Administration continues to tighten enforcement of the nearly 45-year old
293
economic blockade.
Clearly, there is a negative history between Cuba
294
and the U.S. Perhaps the continued preferential treatment of Cubans to295
day is a form of compensation for past mistakes.

283

Id.
Id.
285 See id.
286 See Jose de Cordoba, Guns and Butter: Cuba's Military Puts Business On Front Lines; Under
Castro's Brother, Army Built Joint-Venture Empire; From Hotels to Dolphins, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Nov. 15, 2006, at A1.
287 See id.
288 See Flight, supra note 17; Amnesty International Raps Cuba on Human Rights, EFE NEWS
SERVICES, Jan. 29, 2007 (Amnesty International has called for an end to the economic embargo on
Cuba. The embargo has been detrimental to Cubans’ enjoyment of economic and social rights such as
food, health, and sanitation. It has hampered family reunification. The embargo’s negative impact on
Cuba coincides with Cuba’s violation of human rights.).
289 See Roland Estevez, Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment of 1966 and Helms-Burton:
Adding Insult to Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2002).
290 See U.S. Tightens Embargo, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Nov. 2006, at 3.
291 See The Cost of U.S. Sanctions, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Nov. 2006, at 3.
292 See id. at 4.
293 See id.; Warren Hoge, Vote Reaffirms Opposition To U.S. Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007,
at A6 (U.N. General Assembly voted for the 16th consecutive year against the Cuban embargo. Only
three nations voted in favor of the U.S. policy: Israel, the Marshall Islands and Palau).
294 See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 188, 231 and accompanying text (describing the strife caused by the embargo).
284
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The special treatment possibly continues because Cubans in the U.S.
296
have found various ways to become prominent and self-sustainable. The
presence of well-known Cuban-American individuals is a sign of the ability
of Cubans to assimilate, adjust, and influence the American way of life.
The same argument, however, can be made for various other immigrant
groups who do not receive the same immigration treatment or positive attention from the American public or government.
For example, Haiti, like Cuba, is known for its “politically-tumultuous
297
history and . . . abject poverty.”
Many Haitians made the 700 mile sea
voyage to Miami, FL in the 1960s to “escape the torture and killings perpetrated by François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier and his Tonton Macoutes thugs.
When the dictator died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier,
298
continued the terror, and the exodus burgeoned.” In 1980, about 25,000
Haitians arrived in South Florida along with 125,000 Cubans during the
1980 Mariel boatlift; however, “because of the 1966 Cuban [Adjustment]
Act . . . the Cubans were allowed to stay while most Haitians were sent
299
back.”
Like Cubans, the Haitians’ only means to reach freedom is via the high
300
301
seas. More than one million Haitians live in the U.S. Over one third
302
live in New York’s metro areas. An estimated 20,000 Haitians are living
303
illegally in the U.S. In 1992, an estimated 37,000 Haitians attempted to
reach the U.S. by boat after a military coup drove Haiti's first freely elected
296 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_American; supra note 177 and accompanying text (the
subcommittee during the 1966 hearings voiced an interest in procuring the self-sustainability of the
Cuban people).
297 No Foot, at 437; Bill Bishop, Eugene Native Sees Haitian Strife Up Close, REGISTER-GUARD,
Feb. 17, 2004, at 1D (“[V]iolence spreads in the streets of Haitian cities . . . over the political upheaval
that is claiming scores of lives.” The poor nation is in battle with itself. “The conflict is hardly new to
Haitians, who have had 32 coups in their 200-year history.” Haitians have no jobs, money, food, or
hope for the future. They can’t agree on a solution, but they wish for the violence to stop. Haitians
know that no matter what policies are created or enforced, more people will die); Jacqueline Charles,
Congress is Asked to Let Haitians Stay, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 2007, at 10A (hereinafter, Let Haitians
Stay) (“[S]chools in Port-au-Prince were forced to close days early following a spike in for-ransom
kidnappings of Haitian kids. At least 48 such kidnappings were reported Nov. 10-Dec. 15.”); Micheal
Deibert, For U.S. Haitians, Home is Both Near and Far, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 21, 2006 (hereinafter U.S. Haitians)(“Some 80 percent of the country’s population lives in poverty, and Haiti’s rate of
hunger is ranked as the world’s third highest, surpassed by only Somalia and Afghanistan. Two-thirds of
the labor force has no formal jobs. Deforestation has resulted in 90 percent of Haiti’s tree cover being
destroyed for charcoal and to make room for farming in the past 50 years, leaving little to hold topsoil
when the Caribbean rains fall.”).
298 Janine Zeitlin and Amy Guthrie, Washed Up: 101 Haitian Refugees Sailed North Full of Hope.
They Got Screwed, NEW TIMES BROWARD/PALM BEACH, Nov 29 – Dec 5, 2007, at 14 (hereinafter
Washed Up).
299 Id.
300 See No Foot, supra note 16, at 437.
301 See U.S. Haitians, supra note 312.
302 Id.
303 Let Haitians Stay, supra note 312.
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president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, into exile. However, “Cuba is the only
one that has an agreement with the United States regarding the rights of its
citizens to ask for political asylum. The Haitians have no such agreement
and have become disillusioned with what they perceive is a double standard
305
on the part of the United States.” Similar to U.S.-Cuban relations, it has
been said that the U.S. is responsible for the economic and political predi306
cament in Haiti.
Today, “Haitians are the only refugees that are intercepted in the wa307
ters and returned to their country.” Further, those that do reach U.S. soil
have not been subject to the same fate as Cubans.
On October 29, 2002, over two hundred Haitian emigrants successfully reached American soil; many scrambled in desperation through
bumper-to-bumper traffic on the Rickenbacker Causeway in Miami, in
an effort to elude authorities. Unfortunately touching American soil
for Haitians means nothing, unless they evade authorities and seek re308
fuge with family, friends, and/or human right organizations.
In April 2006, “a fishing boat with 43 Haitians, one Jamaican and one Cu309
ban made its way to land at Hillsboro Beach, [Florida]. The Haitians and
Jamaican will more than likely be sent back to their countries, while the
310
More recently, on March 28, 2007, over
Cuban is almost sure to stay.”
100 Haitian refugees boarded a 40-foot sailboat to escape the situation in
311
Haiti. “Bewildered family members [already in the U.S.] watched as the
government has warehoused their loved ones in secrecy, behind barbed wire
in Pompano Beach, [Florida] and sent them back to Haiti one by one. Pray-

304

J.P. Slavin, 4 Boat People Arrested by Haitian Police, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1992, at A18.
No Foot, supra note 16, at 438; Let Haitians Stay, at 10A (U.S. Rep. Alcee Hastings currently
leads an effort to extend “temporary protected status” to Haitians living illegally in the U.S. “[t]hat
would give them residence and work papers for up to 18 months.” Congress can pass legislation that
designates temporary protected status to a group of immigrants, but it generally defers to the Department
of Homeland Security. According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, temporary protected status has only been extended once—El Salvador); Trenton Daniel, Haitians Protest U.S. Policy
After 43 on Boat are Detained,MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 11, 2006, at 1B (hereinafter 43 on Boat ) (Haitians
should be granted temporary protected status not only because of the great political upheaval, but also
because they have suffered natural disasters).
306 See No Foot, supra note 16, at 446; Let Haitians Stay, at 10A (Haitian government has “blamed
a surge in violence and kidnappings following the 2004 ouster of former Haitian President JeanBertrand Aristide on the U.S. government’s long-standing deportation policy.”).
307 No Foot, supra note 16, at 449.
308 Id. at 456.
309 Hansen Sinclair, Haitians Protest U.S. Policy after Haitians are Sent Home, Cuban Stays,
WESTSIDE GAZETTE, Apr 13-19, 2006, at 1A (hereinafter Haitians Protest).
310 Id.
311 Washed Up, supra note 313.
305
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ers to God and voodoo spirits haven’t saved them. Nor have immigration
312
lawyers.”
President Ronald W. Reagan, on September 29, 1981, proclaimed that,
“the ongoing migration of persons to the United States in violation of our
laws is a serious national problem detrimental to the interests of the United
313
States.” Today, with the immigration anomaly created by the Wet Foot,
Dry Foot Policy, Cubans and Haitians are often involved in confrontations
314
with the U.S. Coast Guard, but only the Cubans get to stay in the U.S.
“For many Haitian-Americans, the United States’ preferential treatment of
315
Cuban immigrants has gone too far.” Additionally, Haitians who do make
it to the U.S. and evade authorities face a low percentage opportunity at
316
Over 21,000 Haitians applied for political asylum begaining asylum.
317
tween the years 1997-2002, but only about 1,200 were approved. In fact,
more than 80 percent of asylum seekers from Haiti have been denied asy318
lum since 2000. According to one report, one immigration judge in the
Miami area “denied 97.6 percent of Haitian cases . . . between 2000 and
319
2005.”
B. The Proposal for the Future
The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 has kept the doors to the U.S. open
for Cubans for forty years. It has been lenient at times; it has been restricted at times, but it has always provided a means to freedom for the Cuban people. A more stringent policy would deprive the U.S. of a most valuable resource—eager individuals who are prepared and willing to contribute
to the American economy, culture, and society. However, for 40 years, the
preferential treatment and the lack of attention to other groups has deprived
this country of such influential persons. “We are asking the U.S. government to give the Haitians the same rights that they afford the refugees of
other nations,” said Marleine Bastien, director of the Haitian Women of
320
321
Miami. “We are asking that all . . . refugees be given [fair] interviews.”
This country has in a way screened out certain refugees, specifically Hai-

312

Id.
No Foot, supra note 16, at 451.
314 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
315 No Foot, supra note 16, at 454.
316 See id. at 456
317 See id.
318 See Rachel L. Swarns, Study Finds Disparities in Judges’ Asylum Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31,
2006, at A15.
319 Washed Up, supra note 313 at 19.
320 See Haitians Protest, supra note 324.
321 See 43 on Boat, supra 320.
313
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tians, who are in dire need of the aid that has been provided to Cubans for
322
over four decades.
Precedent supports a more lenient and broad immigration policy that
323
does not distinguish between a refugee’s nationality. In Matthew v. Diaz,
the Supreme Court of the United States distinguished between American
citizens and aliens, as well as the constitutional protections that apply to
324
these groups. While the Court recognized that all aliens do not need to be
treated homogeneously, the main issue of the case was “whether statutory
325
discrimination within the class of aliens . . . is permissible.” Further, the
Court’s rationale focused on the nature of the requirement Congress places
326
on aliens, i.e., whether the requirement is wholly irrational. Courts have
327
later interpreted “wholly irrational” to mean a rational basis scrutiny. “If
there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
328
legitimate governmental purpose,” the legislation should be upheld.
Thus, Congress must only be rationale in its discrimination amongst
329
aliens. But, what if Congress, in discriminating between Cubans and all
other refugee groups, has been irrational, and after forty years, can no longer express a legitimate governmental purpose? What if the continued use of
the CAA is justifiable, i.e., the government could continue to express a legitimate purpose for allowing Cubans to enter the U.S., but discriminating
between Cubans and other refugees, specifically Haitians, is wholly irra330
tional?
It should be noted that the Supreme Court views the admission of
aliens as the subject which Congress has the most complete power to legis331
The Court has long viewed Congress’ “power to expel or exclude
late.
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s
332
Further,
political departments largely immune from judicial control.”
“although few, if any, countries have been as generous as the United States
in extending the privilege to immigrate, or in providing sanctuary to the
322 See id. (“The stark differences in immigration policy came into the spotlight again.” Protests
over this issues are not new).
323 See Matthew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
324 See id.
325 See id. at 78, 80.
326 See id. at 82-83.
327 See Rodriguez v. U.S., 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999).
328 See id. at 1342.
329 See No Foot, supra note 16, at 461.
330 Id.; see supra note 149-220 and accompanying text. In Section III of this comment, I anticipated how a representative of the 2006 House of Congress would respond to the concerns of the 1996
House Committee that debated the CAA. My goal for that portion of the comment was to justify the
CAA in its fortieth year.
331 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
decisions to exclude aliens are the exclusive province of Congress); Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S.
581 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case).
332 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
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oppressed, limits and classifications as to who shall be admitted are tradi333
tional and necessary elements of legislation in this area.” Congress has,
however, provided some–not all–refugees with aid, and the Court has res334
The Court has even
pectfully allowed Congress to make distinctions.
acknowledged that, “[w]ith respect to each of these legislative policy distinctions, it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status,” to
335
others who deserve it. Thus, the issue of extending the use of the CAA
to, at a minimum, all refugees who arrive to the U.S. by sea is possible ac336
337
cording to the Supreme Court. It requires a shifting of the line drawing.
However, it is not within the jurisdiction of the Court; rather, it requires an
338
additional act of Congress.
Congress, over the past forty years, has approved of the CAA and its
339
preferential treatment of Cubans.
Inadvertently, it has denied others
340
If Congress were to allow, for example, Haitians to
access to the U.S.
enter the U.S. in the same fashion as Cubans, neither group would acquire
341
an automatic right to permanently reside in the U.S. In other words, the
debate over the CAA arises because of the access granted to Cubans above
all other refugees, not an actual grant of status. Immigrant groups seek an
342
equitable opportunity to apply for status in the U.S.
C. Equal Treatment of Cubans and Haitians
Cubans and Haitians belong in the same immigration class. Though
Haiti has received less attention than Cuba, the interests of Haitians and
pro-Haitian activists sound a lot like those expressed by Cubans. According
to former President Clinton, the United States has a “significant interest in
343
Haiti.” The most obvious and important reason for this interest is Haiti’s
333

Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 798.
See id.
335 Id.
336 See id.
337 See id.
338 See supra note 270-76 and accompanying text.
339 See Cuban Refugees Seek New Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1966, at 15.
340 See supra note 19-20 (anecdote describing how the CAA affects refugees from Cuba different
from refugees of all other nations).
341 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (text of the Cuban Adjustment Act) (“May be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe.” This language indicates that
Cubans are granted an opportunity to receive permanent residents unparalleled to any other group, but
they must still comply with all other immigration regulations, and “may” not be adjusted if the Attorney
General deems it proper).
342 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining that the author of this comment does not
intend to criticize Cubans or pro-Cuban attitudes; rather intends to open and extend the privileges to
persons who also deserve, and perhaps need special privileges more than Cubans).
343 Christopher Marquis and Robert A. Rankin, Clinton Lists 6 Reasons Why U.S. Might Use Force
in Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, May, 20, 1994, at 1A.
334
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geographic location.
Haiti is located in America’s backyard.
Further,
346
the United States is interested in the establishment of order in Haiti.
In
347
part, this interest stems from a history of failed intervention in Haiti and
348
the effect of U.S. policy toward Haiti.
A refugee from Cuba and Haiti who takes to the sea in attempting to
reach the U.S. faces many of the same hurdles: (1) the reality of leaving
their homeland and loved ones indefinitely; (2) the sea; (3) avoiding the
U.S. Coast Guard and being subject to the Wet Foot, Dry Foot policy; (4)
access to immigration relief; and (5) a favorable grant of relief from U.S.
immigration services. This general timeline of what a refugee faces does
not begin to account for the realities a seafaring rafter faces, but it can be
used to highlight the procedures Cubans face versus all other refugees.
In terms of the Haitians’ access to immigration relief, only Cubans
349
have an automatic right to apply for adjustment of status. If a Cuban does
not meet the requirements set out by the CAA or is otherwise found to be
inadmissible he/she may not adjust under the CAA. But, generally speaking, a Haitian and a Cuban who face the same persecution in their native
country, face the same dangers at sea, and seek the same life in the U.S., do
350
not receive the same attention under U.S. immigration laws. Simply being Cuban gives rise to a claim for adjustment of status, but being Haitian
351
does not.
Specifically, on the Department of Homeland Security application for
adjustment of status, section (e) and (f) of Part 2 of the application reads as
follows:
(e) I am a native or citizen of Cuba admitted or paroled in the United
States after January 1, 1959, and thereafter have been physically
present in the United States for at least one year;
(f) I am the husband, wife or minor unmarried child of a Cuban described above in (e) and I am residing with that person, and was admitted or paroled in the United States after January 1, 1959, and the-

344

Id.
See id.
346 See id.
347 See generally Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for
the United Nation, 36 Harv. Int’L L.J. 341, 349 (1995).
348 See generally Andrew S. Levin, Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY INT’L L
REV. 389, 427 (1995).
349 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
350 See id.
351 See id.
345
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reafter have been physically present in the United States for at least
352
one year.
The application for adjustment of status does not expressly mention any
353
other group aside from Cubans.
What would the Act look like if it served a wholly rational purpose and
a legitimate governmental purpose?
D. The Cuban/Haitian Adjustment Act of 2007 (“CHAA”)
[T]he status of any alien [who is a native or citizen of Cuba and] who
is a native or citizen of Cuba or Haiti or any other country that the Attorney General recognizes and who has been inspected and admitted
or paroled into the United States [subsequent to January 1, 1959] subsequent to January 1, 2007 and has been physically present in the
United States for at least one year, may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if
the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United
States for permanent residence . . . . The provisions of this Act . . .
shall be applicable to the spouse and child of any alien described in
this subsection, regardless of their citizenship and place of birth, who
354
are residing with such alien in the United States . . . .
The CHAA is not an extension of the CAA, though it may appear like
one. Rather, it is a fairer and less preferential version of the CAA. After all,
Haitians over the past forty years have been subject to far less special
treatment by U.S. immigration, yet have faced an almost identical persecu355
tion and oppression to that of Cubans. In turning to the six concerns from
the 1966 Congressional Hearings—with a few modifications and revisions—Haiti appropriately and justifiably fits within the grand scheme of
356
the CAA.

352 Form
I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status,
http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf.
353 See id.
354 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
355 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
356 See supra notes 149-220 and accompanying text (borrowing from the language and themes of
the 1966 Hearings to create a hypothetical set of concerns and responses geared toward Haiti forty years
after enactment of the CAA).
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E. Hypothetical Congressional Hearings on Haitian Affairs and Immigration Policy
According to the 1966 Hearings, the Act was passed in order to im357
prove the plight of Haitians. These refugees left their home country be358
cause of the oppression of their government.
Today, Haitian farmers have resorted to eating the seeds that would
359
have produced the next harvest of crops. Few hospitals and health clinics
are functional, and those that are, have been filled with malnourished child360
ren. Haiti is a country of endemic, political violence and a stinging po361
362
verty.
Nearly 23,000 Haitians sought to reach the U.S. in the 1980s.
Today, the “majority of the population . . . teeters on the brink of death from
hunger, disease, and displacement . . . [and nationals] of Haiti are subject to
forced repatriation into a country where the government cannot prevent
363
immediate threats to their lives, freedom, and welfare.”
Therefore, because both Haitians and Cubans are subject to unstable and oppressive governmental and non-governmental regimes, the plight of both is lessened if
admitted to the U.S. and given the opportunity to seek status.
According to the 1966 hearings, the formal process for achieving
364
access to the United States from Haiti is inadequate. An individual from
Haiti could not apply for an immigration visa to enter the U.S. from within
Haiti.
Today, Haiti and the U.S. do have a diplomatic relationship; however,
this does not ensure a fair visa application process within Haiti. Since
2003, natives of Haiti are not eligible for the Diversity Visa Lottery Pro365
gram (“Program”). The Program gives individuals from certain countries
—not Haiti—the opportunity to register and win a visa to seek permanent
366
residency in the U.S. Due to the state of affairs in Haiti and the unavailability of visas, an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status should be
granted to Haitians and Cubans.

357

See Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of the Hon. George Ball).
Id.
359 See Howard W. French, Haitians Return to Deepening Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, at
14 (hereinafter Haitians Return).
360 See id.
361 See id.
362 See id.
363 Yvonne Abraham, Suits Filed to Freeze Haitian Deportations, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2006,
at B1.
364 Support for the hypothetical claims and responses made in this section is derived from a study
of the Congressional Hearings in 1966 that led to the enactment of the CAA, and a general understanding of past and current affairs regarding Haiti.
365 2008 Diversity Visa Lottery Program, http://www/state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/72835.htm
366 Id.
358
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According to the 1966 Hearings, professionals and skilled persons
367
from Haiti are being denied access to the United States.
These persons
368
would be a great benefit to American society.
Today, even with the lack of access to the U.S., Haitians have had a
great influence on American society and culture. In 2006 elections, Kwame
Raoul, a Democrat, was re-elected to the Illinois state Senate 13th Dis369
370
trict. M. Rony Francois heads the Florida Department of Health. “The
suburban Miami, [Florida] enclave of El Portal became, in 2000, the first
municipality in the United States to elect a Haitian-American mayor, fol371
lowed by North Miami and Spring Valley, N.Y. Haitian-Americans serve
372
on city councils and municipal bodies throughout the country.” Edwidge
Danticat, author, has successfully written six novels and won various literary awards including being named one of New York Times Magazines “30
373
under 30” to watch. Lylah M. Alphonse, journalist, is a news editor for
the Boston Globe and is also author to a book. Garcelle Beauvais-Nilon,
actress, has modeled for various cosmetic lines, but is best known for her
role on N.Y.P.D. Blue. Wyclef Jean, musician/producer/humanitarian, has
explored various entertainment roles while creating his own foundation,
Yéle Haiti, to aid and rebuild Haiti. The list of Haitians that have impacted
American society is not as long as the Cuban list, but this ties back to preferential treatment Cubans have received over the past forty years. Additionally, at least fourteen universities in Haiti are currently functional, indicating that there is a means to education and that the U.S. could benefit from
allowing these professionals and skilled persons to adjust their immigration
status.
According to the 1966 Hearings, the efforts taken by the U.S. to welcome immigrants are “humanitarian gestures,” and in no way indicate a
374
change in political posture toward the oppressive governments. In other
words, the CHAA is in no way indicative of any agreement with the foreign
375
The
government; rather, it is a form of relief to the oppressed people.
essence of the American posture toward the foreign country is that the foreign country one day return again to the “free world family of nations,”

367

See Hearings, supra note 28, at 9.
Id.
369 See Michael Deibert, For U.S. Haitians, Home is Both Near and Far, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Nov. 21, 2006.
370 See id.
368

371
372 Id.; see also Jonathan P. Hicks, Haitian Candidate Seeks to Add His Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2007, at 1 (Dr. Mathieu Eugene seeks to become the first Haitian member of the New York Council).
373 See generally id.
374 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 17.
375 See id.
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while the U.S. government’s doors remain open to those who wish to flee
376
the oppression from the totalitarian government.
Today, the U.S. has remained involved to some degree in the transition
to peace and democracy in Haiti. An arms embargo has been in place for a
number of years in an effort to prevent violent militias from rising against
377
the government.
However, more recently, the U.S. government has lessened the embargo to support Haitian police that need aid in keeping or378
der.
Nevertheless, a U.S. policy that opens the gateway to America for
Haitians who exit Haiti in search of freedom would in no way be indicative
of a change in diplomatic stance. The U.S. would continue to support peace
and economic prosperity in Haiti.
According to the 1966 Hearings, as the conditions improve in Haiti,
379
immigrants will return to their home land. They do not intend to remain
380
permanently in the United States.
Today, this concern, similar with Cubans, is perhaps the least accurate.
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, there were nearly 100,000 Haitians in
Miami-Dade County, Florida, and nearly 550,000 Haitians in the United
381
States.
An estimated 360,000 Haitians living in the U.S. are foreign
382
born. A Haitian and Cuban that leaves his/her home country likely never
completely cuts ties with his/her homeland, but once a new life has begun
in the U.S., once an immigrant accomplishes what he/she seeks after making the difficult voyage to the U.S., return to Haiti or Cuba is not likely.
According to the 1966 Hearings, immigrants prefer to settle in the
383
U.S., “particularly the Miami area and Florida.” They know how to live
384
with Americans, and have less in common with other regions of the
world. Today, similar to Cubans, this rationale has also grown weaker. In
November 2005, “[e]ighteen Haitian refugees who claim that they are fleeing political persecution and civil unrest in their homeland, landed in [Ja385
maica]. In October 2005, fifteen Haitians migrated to Jamaica in search
of a better life, but Haitian immigration to Jamaica has remained small in
comparison to the migration toward the U.S.

376

Id.
Haiti, US Hold Talks on Lifting Arms Embargo, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 21, 2004.
378 See generally id.
379 See id. at 18.
380 See id.
381 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Selected Population
Group: Haitian.
382 Id.
377

383
384
385

Id. at 24.
Id.
More Haitians Land in Jamaica, WEEKLY GLEANER (Kingston), Nov. 17-23, 2005, at 10.
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The U.S. government has been determined to protect national security
and public order through restricting borders and migration. Government
officials like former Attorney General John Ashcroft have indicated that
“Haitian restrictions are a matter of national security–that migrants from
countries such as Pakistan have used Haiti as a staging point for entry into
386
the United States.” However, Haiti is not on the U.S. Border Patrol’s list
of nations considered to be “special interest” for hosting or supporting ter387
rorism.
More liberal immigration advocates criticize the U.S. government for covering up its real intentions, “[not] tolerat[ing] a large irregular
movement of poor, black immigrants into a politically important state, Flor388
ida.” While immigration officials have not publicly admitted to race being a policy factor, Alex Stepick, director of the Immigration and Ethnicity
Institute at Florida International University says, “[c]onciously or uncons389
ciously . . . the American policies on Haitians are driven by racism.”
There is a perception, a misperception, that all Haitians are “pathetic” that
hails from stereotyping of Haitians based on Haiti being the Western He390
misphere’s poorest nation. “If you come here from a communist country,
it’s OK. If you come from a white country, it’s OK. If you come here from
391
a black country, noncommunist, it’s not OK.”
The majority of the hypothetical rationales and responses support a
Haitian act similar to the CAA granting access to Haitians similar to that
392
given to Cubans. In recognition of the continued hardship faced by Haitians and Cubans, the level of assimilation exemplified by both, and the
hypothetical modern Haitian responses to the concerns of the 1966 Hearings, the U.S. should open its doors to both Haitians and Cubans so that
they may seek adjustment under the immigration laws of the U.S in an
equal and justifiable manner.
V. CONCLUSION
What American principles does the U.S. government intend to project
to the rest of the world? When dealing with Cubans, the 1966 Subcommittee considered and resolved this concern with the following response: We
393
are a nation that encourages freedom and resistance to totalitarianism.
386

Pauline Arrillaga, Haitians: U.S. Policy Biased, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 13, 2006, at 1B (herein
after U.S. Policy Biased).
387 Id.
388 Kathleen Newlan & Elizabeth Grieco, Spotlight on Haitians in the United States, MIGRATION
INFORMATION SOURCE, Apr. 2004, http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=214
(alteration in original).
389 U.S. Policy Biased, at 1B.
390 See id.
391 Sabra Ayres, Haitians Seek Same Treatment as Cubans, SUN-NEWS, Nov. 17, 2002, at A15.
392 See supra, notes 290-300.
393 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 11-12.
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We are also a nation of consistency, one that “practices what it preaches;”
those persons who are hard pressed under totalitarian regimes should be
extended the possibility of becoming U.S. citizens, so long as they work
394
toward the general good and freedom. So what is the rest of the world to
make of the CAA and the preferential treatment of Cubans when denied to
similarly situated groups like Haitians?
Cubans are “fine people and they come from good stock,” but so are
many of the individuals who have been denied the opportunity to adjust
395
their status within the U.S.
Cubans have adjusted well to America,
worked hard, and are no longer a financial burden to the U.S. govern396
ment, but other groups would also be characterized as such if granted
397
forty years of preferential treatment. The CAA set a precedent; the U.S.
will open its doors to groups of individuals who, in the opinion of Con398
gress, will benefit our society. This once was the “give-and-take” of the
CAA. Cubans got access to the U.S., and the U.S., putting aside its violation of Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
the principle of non-refoulement, looked good in the eyes of the international community. Cubans have made the U.S. look great, but forty years
later, though Cubans continue to make an impact on American society, the
number of individuals who have been denied the same rights are beginning
to outnumber and cast a shadow over America’s “special favorites,”– Cubans. In other words, the benefit of accepting Cubans over all other groups
is now outweighed by the number of other willing and worthy individuals
who are as deserving as Cubans, but have been denied access to U.S.
The recent decline in the health of Fidel Castro has led many in Con399
gress to question the future of Cuban migration. The big question tends
to be, “are the Coast Guard and other Homeland Security agencies are pre400
pared” for another mass migration? An estimated 500,000 Cubans could
401
flee Cuba if, upon the death of Castro, more unrest breaks out. “Even an

394

See id.
See id.
396 (to this day, there is no accurate figure for what Cubans have financially cost U.S. taxpayers.
The following are some estimates of the costs undertaken after the Mariel Boatlift: (a) $1 billion on
relocating and screening refugees; (b) $325 million allocated by the U.S. government to local governments to help with needs; (c) $60 million spent by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to detain
refugees; (d) $29 million spent by the Department of Justice, per year, on Cuban programs. “South
Floridian governments still claim they are owed $150 million from the federal bureaucracy for unreimbursed costs.”).
397 See Transformation, supra note 87, at 52.
398 See id. at 18-19.
399 See Tamara Lytle, Mica: U.S. Ready For Cuban Exodus, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 1, 2007, at
A4.
400 Id. (alteration in original) (U.S. Rep. John Mica of Winter Park, Florida, a Republican on the
House Transportation Committee, organized a closed-door meeting for discussion of this issue).
401 See id.
395
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influx of 50,000 would be too much . . . straining schools, jobs, housing,
402
social services and other resources.”
The list of potential drawbacks to
403
any plan implemented to deal with a future influx is long; nevertheless,
the drawbacks spring from the same root–the special treatment of Cubans.
“U.S. policy allows Cubans who reach American soil to have automatic
404
legal status.” Those who favor tightening controls on immigration in this
“already testy national debate” believe the special treatment of Cubans
405
406
should change, and that the CAA is “toast once Castro dies.”
Those who support the continued benefits of the CAA must act fast,
407
before the “testy national debate” is inflamed by the next mass migration.
Many of the concerns from 1966 remain true today and contemporary reasoning supports the continuation of the CAA. However, there is no good
rationale for singling out Cubans over similarly situated persons such as
Haitians. Cubans are not the only group risking their lives or living under
oppressive governmental regimes.
The rationales from the 1966 Hearings that led to the enactment of the
CAA are applicable to more than just one group. Extension of the CAA to
Haitians does not create a slippery slope between the Cubans/Haitians and
all other groups. The similarities between Cubans and Haitians mentioned
throughout this comment indicate that Cubans and Haitians are inseparable
for immigration purposes. Thus, adoption of the Cuban/Haitian Adjustment
Act of 2007 (“CHAA”) grants access to persons who fall within the original
intentions of the CAA and current hypothetical rationales, while eliminating
the “preferential” from the exclusive treatment of Cubans. Haitians deserve
the same attention as Cubans.
Other groups are deserving of immigration access to the U.S., but not necessarily via the proposed CHAA. The one principle that has no justification
is the categorical separation of Cubans and Haitians as a result of the CAA.
The CHAA, applying equally and evenly to a group of similarly situated
non-citizens, rather than Cubans alone, eliminates the “preferential” from
the treatment. The best method for preventing a mass exodus and controlling U.S. borders is some form of preventative political measure and compromise between diplomatic states, but at this stage in U.S.-Cuban and
U.S.-Haitian relations, we can either hope that there will never be another
402 Id. (comment of Andy Gomez, assistant provost of the University of Miami and a scholar on
Cuban issues).
403 Id.
404 Id. (referring to the affect caused by combining the CAA and the Wet Foot, Dry Foot Policy).
405 Id. (Mark Krikorian, head of the Center of Immigration Studies, said “Cuban migrants are now
treated differently—in winning legal status if they land on U.S. soil—than people from other countries.
That should change.”).
406 Id. (statement of Mark Krikorian).
407 Id. (referring to the nature of the debate, and the less than favorable outlook on another immigrant exodus).
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immigration situation like Cuba or Haiti, or take a corrective approach that
simultaneously corrects the special one-sided treatment of one group and
balances the access to the U.S. by providing similarly situated persons, Cubans and Haitian, fair and equal access to the U.S.

